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AN INTERNATIONAL TRAIN WRECK CAUSED IN
PART BY A DEFECTIVE WHISTLE: WHEN THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SOX
CONFLICTS WITH FOREIGN LAWS
Ian L. Schaffer*
INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)' may
prove problematic and burdensome to foreign companies with U.S.
subsidiaries or with securities listed on U.S. exchanges, and to U.S.
companies with subsidiaries abroad. 2 To illustrate this point, consider the
SOX provision requiring that companies with securities listed in the United
States establish codes of conduct containing procedures that allow
employees to anonymously and confidentially report certain proscribed
practices (i.e., "whistleblower hotlines").3 Other countries, however, do not
require that companies in their territories establish such anonymous
whistleblower hotlines; some might even prohibit the establishment of such
hotlines. For example, the French subsidiaries of two American companies
recently approached the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) 4 seeking
authorization to put in place such anonymous whistleblower hotlines. 5 On
May 26, 2005, the CNIL refused to authorize these whistleblower
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents for the help and support they provided me while I was working on this Note, and all
those Law Review members who helped in the production process.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be
codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
2. For the remainder of this Note, the term "foreign companies" refers, in the
collective, to the U.S. subsidiaries of non-U.S. companies, non-U.S. companies doing
business with the United States or listed on U.S. exchanges, and to subsidiaries of U.S.
companies that are located abroad.
3. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
4. CNIL stands for La Commission nationale de l 'informatique et des libert~s.
5. Exide Techs., CNIL Decision No. 2005-111 (May 26, 2005) [hereinafter Exide
Decision], available at www.faegre.com/articles/downform2.asp?docnum=3&aid= 1691
(posting an unofficial translation); McDonald's, CNIL D61ib6ration No. 2005-110 (May 26,
2005) [hereinafter McDonald's Decision], available at
http://www.theworldlawgroup.com/newsletter/details.asp?ID=1243487122005 (posting an
unofficial translation).
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initiatives, finding that they violated French and European privacy and data
protection laws.6
Many multinational corporations may soon find themselves in the same
precarious situation as these two companies. On the one hand, the company
must abide by SOX's regulations to avoid delisting 7 and, depending on
which SOX provisions are violated, potential civil 8 and criminal 9 sanctions
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On the other hand,
if the company complies with SOX, it may find that it now faces civil or
criminal sanctions from foreign governments for violating laws in effect in
those jurisdictions, such as data protection and labor laws.' 0 Even in
situations where a foreign country does not have a law on its books that
would make complying with SOX illegal, the question remains whether it is
appropriate for American law to apply to conduct occurring abroad. That
is, should foreign companies be punished for conduct that is legal in the
jurisdiction in which it occurs?
This Note deals with how the SEC (and U.S. courts) should handle
situations in which foreign companies engage in conduct that may be legal
where it occurs but that violates SOX, as well as situations where
compliance with foreign law requires companies to violate SOX. Part I
provides background information regarding the SEC, the reach of the
securities laws, SOX, the European reaction to SOX, and foreign laws that
might be affected by the extraterritorial reach of SOX. Part I concludes by
discussing how U.S. courts have dealt with the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust and discovery laws in situations where enforcing such laws
abroad would conflict with the interests of a foreign sovereign nation.
Part II analyzes the options available to the SEC (and U.S. courts) in
determining whether to penalize a foreign company for violating the
provisions of SOX by engaging in prohibited conduct or by failing to
engage in required conduct abroad, and the various arguments that support
each option. Part III argues that the determination of whether to penalize
such foreign companies should be made on a case-by-case basis"I or on an
issue-by-issue basis 12 in light of the exigencies of the circumstances. The
SEC can make such determinations through the issuance of no-action letters
6. Exide Decision, supra note 5; McDonald's Decision, supra note 5. For the CNIL's
current view concerning the legality of anonymous whistleblower hotlines, see infra Part
I.D.2.b.iv.
7. Delisting involves having a company's securities removed from the U.S. exchanges.
8. E.g., SOX § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. 112002); id. § 303; id. § 806.
9. E.g., id. §§ 802, 807, 903-04, 906, 1106-07.
10. See infra Part I.D.
11. That is, the SEC should determine whether or not a company should be penalized
based on the specific circumstances faced by that particular company. Such determinations
would have no precedential value. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
12. This term refers to situations in which the SEC should determine, in general,
whether or not companies should be penalized for engaging in some specified conduct
regardless of the specific circumstances. For example, the SEC or a court may interpret a
statute in such a way as to avoid the existence of a securities law violation. See infra Part
III.B.
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(case-by-case basis) 13 and interpretive opinions (issue-by-issue basis); 14
culminating in an SEC order not to take action against foreign companies
where doing so would adversely affect U.S. investors (or the United States
in general) to a significant degree. Courts, on the other hand, can make
such determinations by conducting a comity analysis 15 to determine
whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction (case-by-case basis), and
through favorable statutory interpretations of SOX (issue-by-issue basis). 16
Part III proceeds to demonstrate the application of this approach to
particular instances where the extraterritorial application of SOX might be
problematic to foreign companies.
I. THE CLASH OF THE TITANS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SOX AND
EUROPEAN LAW
This part provides the relevant background information relating to the
conflict between the extraterritorial application of SOX and the laws of
foreign nations. Section A describes some of the workings of the SEC.
Section B discusses SOX and the reasons for its enactment. Section C
describes the foreign reaction to the potential extraterritorial reach of SOX.
Section D deals with the potential burdens that the extraterritorial
application of SOX would have on foreign companies. Finally, Section E
provides the groundwork for an analogy that will be drawn between the
extraterritorial application of SOX and other U.S. laws that have been
controversially applied abroad.
A. Securities and Exchange Commission
This section provides background information concerning the SEC and
U.S. securities laws. First, it describes the powers and functions of the
SEC. It then discusses the extraterritorial application of the securities laws
and the SEC's need for international cooperation in the prosecution and
enforcement of securities law violations. Finally, it chronicles the SEC's
historical tendency, prior to SOX, to treat foreign issuers differently from
domestic ones.
13. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
15. The term "comity analysis," as used in this Note, refers to the balancing of various
factors for the purpose of determining the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction (legislative
or subject matter) and/or whether to abstain from the exercise of such jurisdiction.
16. However, courts must generally "honor an agency's reasonable interpretation of a
statute that Congress has entrusted the agency to administer." Eur. & Overseas Commodity
Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 123 n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)). Thus,
this option may not be available to a court if the SEC has already made an interpretation of
the statute, and if that interpretation is reasonable.
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1. Creation and Functions of the SEC
In response to an unprecedented stock market crash and the resulting
investment losses, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193317 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 18 The main purpose of
these Acts was to promote consumer protection by requiring that companies
disclose all material facts regarding their financial condition. 19 In addition,
provisions were included dealing with the prevention of fraudulent conduct
(e.g., antifraud and insider trading laws). 20
The SEC was established by Section 4 of the Exchange Act 21 for the
purpose of administering and enforcing the securities regulatory statutes,
and to protect the public interest in so doing.22 It has broad statutory
authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary for the exercise of its
functions. 23 The two main functions of the SEC consist of investigating
potential illegal activities and adjudicating alleged violations. 24 One of the
main provisions of the Act deals with the creation and regulation of the
national securities exchanges. 25 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is
the most prominent example of a national exchange that has satisfied the
framework of the Act.26 The daily activities of these exchanges are
overseen by the Division of Market Regulation of the SEC. 27
In addition, the SEC has "the authority to delegate, by published order or
rule, any of its functions to a division of the Commission, an individual
Commissioner, an administrative law judge, or an employee or employee
board."'28 If, thereafter, the SEC refuses to exercise its right of review, or if
such review is not sought within the designated time, then the decision of
"any such division of the Commission, individual Commissioner,
administrative law judge, employee, or employee board, shall.., be
17. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (2000)).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
19. See Brandy L. Fulkerson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and U.S. Securities
Law: Seeking Limits for Application of the 10(b) and l0b-5 Antifraud Provisions, 92 Ky.
L.J. 1051, 1053-54 (2004).
20. Id.
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
22. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 406 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78w.
24. SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec. Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
26. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comment, Move over Tickertape, Here Comes the Cyber-
Exchange: The Rise of Internet-Based Securities Trading Systems, 47 Cath. U. L. Rev.
1009, 1013 (1998). To ensure a secure and fair marketplace, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) has promulgated rules and regulations by which its members must abide. Id. at
1014. The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations System
(NASDAQ), on the other hand, is a registered securities association (as opposed to a national
securities exchange like the NYSE), and is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3.
27. Gallagher, supra note 26, at 1021.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(a).
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deemed the action of the Commission." 29 Finally, Congress has authorized
the SEC to grant discretionary exemptions from compliance with the
Exchange Act under the appropriate circumstances. 30
2. No-Action Process
Not only does the SEC promulgate rules and regulations under the
securities laws, it also provides guidance concerning these laws. For
example, through the "no-action" process, the SEC staff provides its
informal views concerning proposed courses of conduct that raise
compliance issues under the securities laws.31 The SEC staff may issue two
types of letters in responding to requests made through this process. More
often than not it will respond by issuing a "no-action" letter, which is "[a]
letter from the staff of a governmental agency stating that if the facts are as
represented in a person's request for an agency ruling, the staff will advise
the agency not to take action against the person. ' 32 Alternatively, the SEC
may issue a somewhat broader response in the form of an "interpretive"
letter, which is an expression of how the staff will interpret a statute or rule
in the context of a particular course of conduct.33
Although the SEC has repeatedly stated that it is not bound by staff no-
action letters, a recipient of a favorable letter can be fairly sure that the SEC
will treat it as binding.34 While only the recipient can rely on the letter
directly, it also indicates to third parties the staff's current views concerning
the specific question involved35-because no-action and interpretive letters
are, except as provided for by statute, made available to the public. 36 The
29. Id. § 78d-1(c).
30. Id. § 78mm(a)(1) ("[T]he Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, may. . . exempt
any person, security, or transaction.., from any provision ... of [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et.
seq.] ... to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
and is consistent with the protection of investors.").
31. Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. Law. 1019, 1019
(1987). In this process, those interested in pursuing a certain course of conduct write a letter
to the SEC staff requesting statutory interpretations or assurances that if such conduct is
engaged in, the staff would not recommend that the Commission bring an enforcement
action against the requestor. Id. at 1019 n. 1.
32. Black's Law Dictionary 1072 (8th ed. 2004).
33. Lemke, supra note 31, at 1022; see also Prod. Tool Corp. v. Employment and
Training Admin., 688 F.2d 1161, 1166 (7th Cir. 1982) ("It is well established that an agency
charged with a duty to enforce or administer a statute has inherent authority to issue
interpretive rules informing the public of the procedures and standards it intends to apply in
exercising its discretion.").
34. Lemke, supra note 31, at 1042. This is only the case, however, if the specific facts
and circumstances described in the no-action request are determined to exist in fact. Id. On
the rare occasion that the SEC has brought an enforcement action against a favorable no-
action letter recipient, it has alleged that false and misleading statements were contained in
the request. Id.
35. Id. at 1043; see also Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory
Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework,
83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 924-25 (1998).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 200.81 (2005).
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precedential value of SEC staff responses varies depending on whether it
involves an "interpretive" or "no-action" letter.37 "Interpretive" letters have
more precedential value than "no-action" letters because, while one can be
reasonably certain that the staff will interpret a statute or rule the same way
in similar situations, the staff decision in a "no-action" letter is dependent
upon the specific circumstances involved in a particular request. 38
3. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws
The Exchange Act "is silent as to its extraterritorial application." 39
However, despite the general presumption against jurisdiction unless
explicitly conferred by statute, 40 most of the federal circuits, in determining
when the federal securities laws reach overseas transactions, have employed
a "conduct" and "effects" framework. 41  Federal courts, under the
"conduct" test, have "subject matter jurisdiction if the defendant's conduct
in the United States was more than merely preparatory to the fraud, and
particular acts or culpable failures to act within the United States directly
caused losses to foreign investors abroad."'42 Under the "effects" test, a
federal court has jurisdiction if the illegal activity occurring abroad causes a
"substantial effect" within the United States.43 Satisfying either one of
these tests is sufficient for a court to find subject matter jurisdiction.44
However, U.S. jurisdiction over foreign companies pursuant to the
securities laws arguably extends only to matters that are clearly related to
securities regulation. 45 American statutes "have been construed to apply
only to areas and transactions in which American law would be considered
operative under prevalent doctrines of international law." 46 Consequently,
a U.S. listing does not give the United States license to regulate foreign
issuers in all aspects. For example, it could not regulate labor and
employment relations of these companies because "labor conditions ... are
the primary concern of a foreign country, ' 47 and American law would
therefore not be considered operative with respect to foreign conduct
relating to labor conditions regulations.
37. Lemke, supra note 31, at 1043.
38. Id. at 1043-44.
39. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991).
40. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
41. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 (D. Md.
2004).
42. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478.
43. See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1989).
44. In re RoyalAhold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
45. See Minodora D. Vancea, Exporting US. Corporate Governance Standards Through
the Sarbanes-OxleyAct: Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 Duke L.J. 833, 843 (2003).
46. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953).
47. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949). Some courts have already held
that SOX does not apply to employees working outside of the United States. See infra notes
333, 335 and accompanying text.
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4. International Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws
In response to today's global marketplace, where cross-border securities
transactions have become routine, efforts to formalize cooperation among
regulators have intensified.48  Such cooperation is essential to the
enforcement of the U.S. securities laws because "[t]he ability to establish
subject matter and personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts is of little use if the
SEC cannot investigate and take enforcement action against inside traders
operating abroad."'49 Over time, the scope of cooperation has evolved from
requests under the Hague Convention and pursuant to "letters rogatory," to
the implementation of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).50 Each new development enhances
international regulatory authorities' ability to prosecute and investigate
activities that cross into a foreign regulator's jurisdiction. 51
In civil and criminal proceedings, domestic courts may attempt to obtain
information located abroad through the use of "letters rogatory," which are
formal requests sent to a foreign tribunal asking that documents be
produced or witnesses be examined in that jurisdiction. 52 This method,
however, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, letters rogatory are
cumbersome because they require that a judicial proceeding be pending. 53
They are also unpredictable because the receiving court is not required to
provide assistance nor need it justify its denial. 54 Finally, these documents
are time-consuming, 55 complicated, and "do not supersede foreign bank
secrecy laws."'56
48. Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of
Securities Enforcement, 39 Int'l Law. 667, 667 (2005).
49. Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading
Regulations, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 263, 343 (1999).
50. Mann & Barry, supra note 48, at 667.
51. Id.
52. Richard A. Westin, Expatriation and Return: An Examination of Tax-Driven
Expatriation by United States Citizens, and Reform Proposals, 20 Va. Tax Rev. 75, 125
(2000); Caroline A.A. Greene, Note, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent
Advances in Assistance and Cooperation, 27 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 635, 639 (1994)
("[I]nformation from abroad may be obtained by the traditional letter rogatory, a formal
request from a court in one jurisdiction to a court in the jurisdiction in which the information
or evidence is located.").
53. Westin, supra note 52, at 125. Thus, before letters rogatory can be sought, an SEC
staff member at the administrative level in a criminal investigation must get a prosecutor to
impanel a grand jury. Cf id. at 125-26 (referring to an IRS agent in a criminal tax
investigation).
54. Greene, supra note 52, at 639; see Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and
Prosecution of White Collar Crime: International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available
to Address Them, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 209, 224 (2002) ("When prosecutors seek
such evidence using the traditional letters rogatory approach, the requested countries provide
the assistance, if at all, simply as a matter of comity."); Westin, supra note 52, at 126
("Execution by foreign countries of letters rogatory is discretionary and often poorly
supervised via diplomatic channels.").
55. It often takes over a year to get the letter due to the complexity of the U.S.
Attorney's process. Westin, supra note 52, at 126.
56. Greene, supra note 52, at 639.
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The Hague Convention,5 7 which encompasses letters rogatory, was the
first concrete agreement through which the "judicial authority of [one]
Contracting State may ... request the competent authority of another
Contracting State ... to obtain evidence ... for use in judicial proceedings,
commenced or contemplated. ' 58 The Convention's utility to the SEC is
limited, however, because it can be used only in civil judicial proceedings
and not in SEC investigations or administrative proceedings-or any other
criminal investigation or prosecution. 59 Moreover, requests may be refused
if their execution falls outside the functions of the judiciary, or if the
foreign power believes that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced
by their execution. 60 Finally, Article 23 of the Hague Convention provides
a further limitation in that it permits a signatory to "declare that it will not
execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." 6 1
Fortunately, the SEC is not limited to using the Hague Convention to
obtain assistance or information from a foreign state. To facilitate the
investigation and prosecution of criminal matters, the United States has
entered into MLATs62 with more than forty-five countries, including many
of the Caribbean islands. 63 MLATs that are negotiated through formal
diplomatic channels have the force of law and compel their signatories to
provide assistance on a broad range of criminal matters. 64 In addition to
granting the power to compel the production of records and the appearance
of witnesses, MLATs generally permit signatories to request forfeiture
actions, the enforcement of domestically issued forfeiture judgments, and
the freezing and/or repatriation of assets located abroad. 65  Another
advantage of such treaties is that parties to MLATs may obtain information
either in preparation for or during trial, regardless of whether the requesting
57. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
58. Id. art. 1.
59. Westin, supra note 52, at 127; Greene, supra note 52, at 639-40.
60. Hague Convention, supra note 57, art. 12. However, the treaty goes on to state that
"[e]xecution may not be refused solely on the ground that under its internal law the State of
execution claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that its
internal law would not admit a right of action on it." Id.
61. Id. art. 23.
62. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), which are bilateral treaties, are
negotiated through diplomatic channels and must be ratified by the Senate. Elliott M. Beard,
A Critical Analysis of the Effects of Colello v. SEC on International Securities Law
Enforcement Agreements, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 271, 272-73 (1996).
63. Eric S. Rein & Bethany N. Schols, Creative New Mechanisms for Banks to Recover
Stolen Collateral, 122 Banking L.J. 725, 727 (2005). MLATs also exist between the United
States and, among others, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom concerning the
Cayman Islands, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and Thailand. Greene, supra note 52, at
641-42.
64. Snow, supra note 54, at 224 ("[MLATs] create an international treaty obligation to
provide the types of assistance set out in the agreement."); Greene, supra note 52, at 640.
65. Beard, supra note 62, at 273; see also Rein & Schols, supra note 63, at 727.
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state has filed charges.66 Thus, unlike letters rogatory and the Hague
Convention, MLATs do not require the existence of a judicial proceeding in
order to obtain foreign assistance.
Communications made pursuant to MLATs pass directly between the
"Central Authorities" of the countries involved, 67 which are separate from
the judiciary. 68 Because the Department of Justice must approve all
requests made pursuant to MLATs, the SEC '.acks the basic power to decide
whether to request foreign assistance under these treaties.69 One of the
major limitations on the SEC's use of MLATs to enforce U.S. securities
laws abroad is that many of these treaties have "dual criminality"
provisions, which require that the offense being investigated is a crime in
both jurisdictions. 70 Another limitation of MLATs is that they often permit
the executing country to deny assistance in a number of situations; for
example, when assistance would prejudice its sovereignty or security.71
When using an MLAT is not an option or would be inefficient, the SEC
may still seek foreign assistance through an MOU 72 negotiated with the
securities regulator of that jurisdiction. Unlike MLATs, which are
negotiated through diplomatic channels, carried out by designated Central
Authorities, and require ratification by the Senate, MOUs are negotiated
directly between the regulatory bodies in charge of the securities laws of the
two countries, are carried out by these same regulatory bodies, and do not
require ratification. 73 This lack of formality often makes the use of MOUs
more efficient and effective than the other methods available to the SEC for
obtaining foreign assistance. 74 An additional advantage of MOUs is that,
66. Greene, supra note 52, at 640.
67. Snow, supra note 54, at 226. The Central Authority for the United States "is always
the United States Attorney General or his designee." Id. For purposes of making and
receiving MLAT requests, the Attorney General's designee is the Office of International
Affairs in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. Id. For the foreign party to the
MLAT, the Central Authority is usually the Attorney General, Minister of Justice, Minister
of Interior, or whoever is responsible for international criminal assistance matters in that
country. Id. at 226-27.
68. Beard, supra note 62, at 273. This alleviates the problem of states refusing to hand
over information to nonjudicial authorities under the Hague Convention. Id.
69. Id. at 274; cf Rein & Schols, supra note 63, at 727 ("The powers and remedies
offered pursuant to MLAT are not available to private persons or corporations, but rather to
the prosecutors. Thus, the [SEC) must seek assistance from the U.S. Attorney's Office.").
70. Beard, supra note 62, at 273-74 ("[T]he most important [restriction on the
effectiveness of MLATs] is the widespread use of a dual criminality requirement. Under the
dual criminality requirement, the offense being investigated must be a criminal violation in
both the requesting state and the executing state. Thus, where an action is illegal in the
United States, but not in the requested country ... no assistance as to the investigation of
that action may be obtained under an MLAT." (internal citations omitted)).
71. Id. at 274; Snow, supra note 54, at 225.
72. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are nonbinding agreements among foreign
regulators, under which the regulators state their intention to assist one another in the
enforcement of various laws and regulations. See Greene, supra note 52, at 649.
73. Id.
74. Beard, supra note 62, at 275 (arguing that the characteristics of MOUs result in
"greater speed and reliability of requests and assistance," and "provide [for] a more
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unlike MLATs, they do not have dual criminality requirements. 75 Finally,
although MOUs do not obligate the parties to assist one another, such
assistance generally tends to be provided.76
5. The SEC's Historical Treatment of Foreign Corporations
In the years following the enactment of the securities laws, when the
presence of foreign issuers was minimal, the SEC held foreign issuers to the
same standard of disclosure that applied to domestic issuers.77 However,
foreign offerings into the U.S. increased to such a point in the 1960s and
1970s that Congress enlarged the scope of the registration laws on foreign
corporations. Consequently, the SEC developed the Foreign Integrated
Disclosure System. Under this system, foreign issuers were subjected to
slightly different disclosure requirements. 78 In reaching this decision, the
SEC was forced to engage in a difficult balancing of interests-namely, it
had to balance the strong interest in providing U.S. investors with full
access to consistent and understandable information, with the equally
important interest of encouraging foreign companies to make offerings in
the United States.79
The result of this balancing act was Form 20-F.80 In addition to allowing
foreign issuers to prepare their financial statements according to their home
countries' currency, Form 20-F also gave them the option of using either
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or alternative bodies of
accounting principles. 81  Finally, specific corporate officers were not
required to verify the contents of a Form 20-F. Rather, all that was required
was a signature on behalf of the company.8 2
Form 20-F is just one example of the SEC's traditional policy toward
accommodating differences between U.S. and foreign corporate practices
expeditious means for establishing mutual assistance mechanisms"); Greene, supra note 52,
at 649 ("MOUs are expected to be more efficient and predictable than MLATs in obtaining
information regarding securities violations because they are negotiated and implemented by
parties with direct responsibility for regulating their respective securities markets.").
75. Beard, supra note 62, at 275.
76. Prentice, supra note 49, at 345 ("These agreements are not binding, but the parties
generally live up to them.").
77. This was because the presence of foreign issuers in the U.S. market was not strong
enough to warrant investigating the differences between U.S. and foreign issuers' business
practices. Matthew M. Benov, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxlev: Accommodating
Foreign Private Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 Transnat'l Law.
439, 444 (2003).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. If foreign issuers have already registered securities under the Securities Act, then
Form 40-F is used. Anupama J. Naidu, Comment, Was Its Bite Worse than Its Bark? The
Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United
States, 18 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 271, 275 (2004).
81. See Benov, supra note 77, at 444-45.
82. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed.
Reg. 41,877, 41,882 (proposed June 20, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240,
249).
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where doing so does not significantly interfere with investor protection. In
balancing its regulatory priorities, the SEC has historically weighed the risk
of deterring foreign issuers from the U.S. securities market heavily against
the interest in promoting investor protection. 83  The accommodations
granted to foreign issuers by the SEC include aggregate executive
compensation disclosure rather than individual disclosure (where this is
permitted in the home country); exemption from the proxy rules and the
insider reporting and short swing profit recovery provisions of Section 16;
acquiescence in NYSE and National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) corporate governance standards that are tailored to the needs of
foreign private issuers; and interim reporting on the basis of home country
and stock exchange practice rather than mandated quarterly reports. 84 As a
result of these accommodations by the SEC, more than 1300 foreign private
issuers from over fifty countries had become reporting companies by the
end of 2001.85
Although the SEC was not expressly granted comprehensive authority
over corporate governance by statute, a number of long-standing statutory
provisions allow for the SEC to exercise its authority in making corporate
governance rules or regulations.8 6 Despite this fact, when it comes to
internal domestic corporate law and governance, the SEC has traditionally
respected and deferred to the sovereignty of other nations. 87 For example,
following the 1964 Amendments to the Exchange Act, the SEC issued a
release explaining that its traditional deference to foreign companies on
management disclosure issues stemmed from its recognition that foreign
companies had different disclosure regimes abroad.88 This all changed in
the wake of the corporate scandals at the turn of the twenty-first century.
83. Naidu, supra note 80, at 278.
84. Letter from Todd M. Malan, Executive Dir., Org. for Int'l Investment, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Aug. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/tmmalan1.htm (discussing SEC Rule S7-21-02).
85. See id.
86. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, 255-56, 256
n.93 (2005).
87. Corinne A. Falencki, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 1211, 1229 (2004). In fact, the initial Senate
bill that ultimately led to the passage of the Exchange Act would have exempted all foreign
securities unless the SEC provided otherwise. Id. Moreover, in an official SEC policy
statement, the SEC stated, "In seeking solutions to common problems.., the goal of
investor protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to the realities of each
marketplace.... While seeking common solutions to international issues, regulators should
also be mindful and respectful of existing national regulatory frameworks." Regulation of
International Securities Markets, Securities Act Release No. 6807, Exchange Act Release
No. 26,284, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,636, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963, 46,963-64,
46,966 (Nov. 21, 1988).
88. See Registration Forms for Foreign Issuers, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,743 (Nov. 16, 1965).
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B. All Aboard the SOX Train: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A wave of corporate accounting scandals was uncovered in the first few
years of the twenty-first century.8 9 These scandals, involving numerous
large and well-respected firms, 90 ultimately cost shareholders $460
billion.9 1 When the corporate practices of these companies came to light,
the public's confidence in the securities markets and in corporate ethics and
governance was shattered.92  Although many of these companies'
employees had been aware of fraud and other abuses, they had either failed
to come forward with this information because they feared retaliation, or
they had come forward and their warnings went unheeded. 93 Congress
responded to this crisis by swiftly passing into law the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act,94 with the intent of "ensur[ing] that investors [will] once again trust
corporate executives and their financial reports, and have confidence in the
independence of accountants and analysts." 95
SOX provided the SEC with wide latitude to use its rulemaking power to
resolve many technical issues that remained unaddressed. 96 For example,
the SEC may promulgate rules and regulations that are "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest. ' '97 Moreover, the SEC has rulemaking
power under the Act to develop accounting standards under Section 19 of
the Securities Act 9 8 and Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act;99 define
prohibited non-auditing services by rule;100 prohibit the listing of
companies on exchanges due to noncompliance with SOX provisions; 1 1
develop procedures for CEO certification of financials; 10 2 develop rules for
89. See Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting
Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2005).
90. These firms include Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, and WorldCom. Id.
91. John P. Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 211, 212 (2003).
92. Vaughn, supra note 89, at 2.
93. Id.; See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79
Wash. L. Rev. 1029, 1041 (2004) (quoting a Wall Street Journal article for the proposition
that although numerous employees knew of the fraud at WorldCom, they failed to disclose
such information for fear of speaking out).
94. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
95. Press Release, Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Comm., Remarks on the Passage of the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002 (July 15, 2002), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/prel02/0715pass.htm.
96. See Lucci, supra note 91, at 231.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (Supp. II 2002).
98. Id. § 77s; see id. § 7218(b) (dirccting that the SEC promulgate rules and regulations
for the purpose of carrying out § 77s(b) of this title).
99. id. § 78m.
100. See id. § 78j-l(a).
101. Id. § 78j-l(m)(l)(A).
102. Id. § 7241 (a).
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the treatment of "off-balance sheet transactions"; 10 3 require disclosure
regarding the presence of at least one financial expert on the audit
committee; 104 and develop rules and regulations concerning the retention of
relevant records by auditors. 10 5  These are just samples of the wide
rulemaking authority granted to the SEC under SOX.
To prevent a repeat of Enron-like cases, Congress also incorporated
provisions into SOX that were meant to encourage employees to come forth
with information regarding financial and accounting irregularities. In
particular, Section 301 of SOX amended Section 10A of the Exchange Act
of 1934 to state that "[e]ach audit committee shall establish procedures
for ... the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the
issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters; and.., the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of
the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters." 106 Absent compliance with this rule, a company may not list its
securities on an American exchange. 10 7 In addition, SOX has provisions
that protect whistleblowers from adverse consequences related to
compliance with SOX. For example, Section 806 of SOX, which amends
18 U.S.C. § 1514, protects employees of publicly traded companies from
retaliation for reporting conduct that "the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or
regulation of the Securities Exchange Commission, or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders."' 10 8
Finally, SOX has increased the statutory remedies available to the
SEC. 109 For example, the SEC previously lacked the authority to impose
fines and penalties on issuers or management, and "could not enforce the
disgorgement of management's ill-gotten profits, thus having to rely instead
on the equitable discretion of the courts.""l 0 Subsequent to the passage of
SOX, however, the SEC has not only the Exchange Act penalties at its
disposal, but also may seek injunctions against certain prohibited
103. Id. § 78m(j) (requiring the issuance of "final rules providing that each annual and
quarterly financial report required to be filed with the Commission shall disclose all material
off-balance sheet transactions").
104. Id. § 7265.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4). Although the statute does not prescribe specific procedures
to be adopted by audit committees, an effective procedure for the complaint process should
"(1) protect employees against retaliation; (2) allow for the intake of anonymous complaints;
(3) encourage employees to lodge legitimate complaints; (4) call for expeditious internal
investigation; and (5) facilitate appropriate remedial response." Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A.
Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When the Whistle Blows in the Post
Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. Corp. L. 445, 457 (2005).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(1)(A).
108. SOX § 806, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1514A).
109. See Maria Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley on European Companies, 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 785, 787-90 (2004).
110. Id. at 788.
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conduct,' I I such as the issuing of false financial statements or the failure to
maintain an independent audit committee. As with most securities
provisions, the SEC continues to have authority to exempt entities from
SOX's coverage. 12
The next section discusses the European reaction to SOX. In the past, the
SEC had responded to the globalization of U.S. capital markets by granting
a series of exemptions and accommodations to facilitate the listing of
foreign companies on U.S. exchanges."l 3 The SEC appears to have taken a
tougher stance in its treatment of SOX, applying its tough new disclosure
and corporate governance requirements to both foreign and domestic
issuers. 114  In light of the international community's hostile reaction,
however, the SEC has softened some of SOX's more controversial
provisions by granting limited exemptions to foreign issuers. 115
C. Seeking a Transfer from the SOX Train, or at Least a Lower Fare: The
Foreign Response to the Potential Extraterritorial Reach of SOX
This section discusses the aftermath of the SEC's determination that
SOX was meant to apply equally to both foreign and domestic companies.
Subsection 1 describes the international community's reaction to the
potential extraterritorial reach of SOX, while subsection 2 discusses how
the extraterritorial application of SOX has impacted, and will likely
continue to impact, the U.S. securities market.
1. Foreign Reaction to SOX
The international community did not welcome SOX with open arms.1 16
From its inception, it has been criticized by foreign commentators as being
hastily drafted and as an attempt by Congress to achieve a quick-fix
solution to corporate governance problems in an election year. 117
Commentators, corporate leaders, and officials, on at least five continents,
have either publicly criticized the Act or voiced concern over its
ambiguities. 118
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1).
112. See, e.g., id. § 7216(c) ("The Commission, and the Board... may... exempt any
foreign public accounting firm, or any class of such firms, from any provision of this Act or
the rules of the Board or the Commission issued under this Act.").
113. Kenji Taneda, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities
Regulation, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 715, 716.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Lucci. supra note 91, at 217. For example, "[t]he application of the audit-
committee-restructuring provisions to foreign issuers created a furor." Roberta S. Karmel,
The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance,
33 Stetson L. Rev. 849, 874 (2004).
117. Lucci, supra note 91, at 217.
118. Id. at 235-37.
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Calls for exemptions, by companies and countries alike, began almost
immediately. In support of such exemptions, many foreign companies
publicly stated that, in addition to being too strict, the SOX regulations
duplicate regulations already imposed in their respective countries. 119 For
example, one of Europe's most authoritative representatives of business, the
Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE),
argued that companies with primary listings on European exchanges were
already subject to tough audit standards, and that the additional burdens of
SOX were not necessary to achieve the sought-after result. 120  The
European Commission also got involved. In a letter, dated February 18,
2003, the European Commission requested full recognition of the
equivalence of E.U. corporate governance systems from the SEC, and thus
full exemptions for E.U. lawyers, companies, and auditors from SOX.' 2 1
European countries also reacted with hostility to the requirement that
they register with and submit annual reports to the SOX-created Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 122 For example, in a
letter to SEC chairman William Donaldson, E.U. Commissioner Frits
Bolkestein stated that such registration was "unnecessary, burdensome and
disproportionate."' 123 Furthermore, he argued that PCAOB's access to
internal audit documents would breach the professional secrecy laws that
exist in most European countries. 124 Finally, Commissioner Bolkestein
demanded an exemption from registering with the PCAOB for European
audit firms working for U.S.-listed companies, and warned that the E.U.
may be forced to reciprocate by requiring American firms to register with
all member states. 125
119. Id. at 234. Executives of these already highly regulated firms argue that SOX adds a
layer of unnecessary regulation, and that they should therefore be granted exemptions from
its provisions. Id. at 240. Thus far, efforts by individual countries to obtain exemptions for
their corporations from SOX due to the presence of similar oversight entities have been
unsuccessful. Id.
120. Cardilli, supra note 109, at 791. Moreover, a number of the world's largest
companies responded to the new threats of liability posed by SOX by forming the
Reciprocity in International Accounting Coalition (RIAC) to lobby for exemptions from
SOX (and, in particular, to the accounting rules that apply to foreign firms). Lucci, supra
note 91, at 218-19. The focus of RIAC is to ensure that future legislation and rules are not
applied to foreign corporations or accounting firms, and if they are applied that they be less
burdensome on such firms. Id. at 219.
121. Letter from Alexander Schaub, Dir.-Gen., European Comm'n (EC), to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Comment Letter from EC], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/aschaubl.htm (commenting on SEC Rule S7-02-
03).
122. Cardilli, supra note 109, at 808.
123. Id.
124. Id. Among the jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws are Switzerland, the Bahamas,
and the Cayman Islands. Harvey L. Pitt et. al., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational
Securities Market, 9 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 375, 404-11 (1987).
125. Cardilli, supra note 109, at 808.
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The SEC responded to these concerns by relaxing some of the SOX
rules. 126 For example, while most U.S. companies were required to comply
with the new rules by October 2004, the deadline for compliance by non-
U.S. companies was extended until July 2005.127 Moreover, to
accommodate those foreign practices that make strict compliance with SOX
nearly impossible for some companies, the SEC granted a number of
exemptions regarding a listed company's audit committee membership. 128
According to the SEC, the exemptions allow non-U.S. "companies to abide
by the 'spirit' of Sarbanes-Oxley without disrupting their existing
practices."' 129 Despite these concessions, a survey of nearly a thousand
European CEOs revealed that sixty-one percent of them intend to turn their
backs on the U.S. market, citing over-regulation as "the biggest threat to
their business."130
2. Consequences of the Extraterritorial Application of SOX
According to David Hirschmann, a point man at the Chamber of
Commerce in Washington, D.C., SOX has brought about a number of
unintended consequences which must be addressed. 13 1  For example,
companies are making unnecessary expenditures "to meet the bureaucratic
demands of new rules, [and are deciding to] postpone certain technology
purchases to avoid running afoul of new compliance requirements.' 32
Adjusting to the new requirements imposed by SOX costs the U.S.
economy $5.5 billion each year. 133 In addition, medium-sized companies
126. Andrei Postelnicu, Concern over ADRs Leads SEC to Relax Sarbanes-Oxley Rules,
Fin. Times (U.S.), Apr. 14, 2003, at 25. The SEC decided to relax the rules mainly because
companies such as Daiwa (Japan), Porsche (Germany), and Benfield Group (U.K.) had
refused to list themselves on U.S. exchanges due to the stringent requirements of SOX. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. For example, these exemptions include the following:
(1) allowing non-management employees to serve as audit committee members,
consistent with "co-determination" and similar requirements in some countries; (2)
allowing shareholders to select or ratify the selection of auditors, also consistent
with requirements in many foreign countries; (3) allowing alternative structures
such as boards of auditors to perform auditor oversight functions where the
structures are provided for under local law; and (4) addressing the issue of foreign
government shareholder representation on audit committees.
Falencki, supra note 87, at 1235.
129. Postelnicu, supra note 126.
130. Larry Schlesinger, Sarbanes-Oxley Scares Off European CEOs, Accountancy Age,
Jan. 24, 2003, http://www.accountancyage.com/2031960.
131. Kurt Eichenwald, Reform Effort at Businesses Feels Pressure, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
2005, at Al.
132. Id.
133. Roland Hefendehl, Enron, WorldCom, and the Consequences: Business Criminal
Law Between Doctrinal Requirements and the Hopes of Crime Policy, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
51, 53 (2004).
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are incurring substantial costs as a result of SOX, despite the fact that the
Act does not specifically target them.134
Perhaps the most significant effect of the extraterritorial reach of SOX is
the diminishing appeal of American stock exchanges to foreign issuers. 135
Thus far, Daiwa in Japan, Porsche in Germany, and Benfield Insurance in
the United Kingdom have delayed listing on the NYSE due to SOX. 136 In
deciding not to list on the NYSE, Porsche listed SOX's certification
requirement as playing a major role in arriving at its decision. 137 Even
when SEC exemptions are taken into account, the significant hardship
imposed by SOX on foreign issuers--especially German ones-may cause
them to follow Porsche's lead. 138
To add to this problem, foreign stock exchanges are on the rise and are
more than willing to accept, with open arms, those issuers scared off from
the U.S. markets as a result of the onerous requirements of SOX. In fact,
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has begun to market itself to companies
in Europe and Asia as a means of avoiding the strict requirements of SOX,
thus capitalizing on the prospect of greater U.S. regulation. 139 The LSE,
Europe's largest exchange, has been successful in attracting European and
German issuers to its capital market. 140  This exchange, along with
Euronext, 141 the second largest European exchange, provides German
issuers with access to capital while subjecting them only to their home
countries' regulations, and thus are viable alternatives to the U.S.
134. In fact, the costs associated with listing on a stock exchange by a medium-sized
company have increased from $1.3 to $2.5 million. Id. For example, Werner Brandt (Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) at SAP AG) estimates that his company has expended an additional
$2.6 million annually as a result of compliance with SOX. Id.
135. The NYSE has reported that in recent years the number of new foreign listings has
decreased. Eichenwald, supra note 131. For example, due to the rigorous new demands on
the American market, the Exchange recently lost out on a giant initial public offering for Air
China. Id.
136. Falencki, supra note 87, at 1234.
137. Naidu, supra note 80, at 280. Applying SOX to German corporations had been
difficult because, in Germany, the responsibility for the annual financial statement ordinarily
resides in several boards consisting of more than twenty individuals. Hefendehl, supra note
133, at 52.
138. See infra Part I.D.3. In a recent meeting called by the German Industries Federation,
at which twenty-four German companies with securities listed on U.S. exchanges were in
attendance, an official of Bayer AG stated that "German companies are not very happy with
this legislation because indirectly it moves into areas covered by European regulations and in
particular contradicts German law." Falencki, supra note 87, at 1228 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
139. Falencki, supra note 87, at 1234. For example, the London Stock Exchange's
deputy international business development manager commented that "[qjuite a few
companies have postponed or cancelled listings on the NYSE because of regulatory
uncertainty. Companies are very concerned about the hard rule approach in the United
States, and that does clearly present us with an opportunity which we are grasping." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See Naidu, supra note 80, at 309.
141. Although Euronext's goal is to create a unified European financial market,
companies listed on this exchange are primarily subject to their home countries' regulations.
2006] 1845
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
exchanges.' 42 Consequently, by listing on the LSE or Euronext, German
companies can avoid the restructuring and increased exposure to liability
imposed by SOX. 143
The extraterritorial application of SOX significantly increases the cost of
compliance for foreign companies that decide not to leave the U.S. market.
Currently, approximately 470 foreign companies are listed on the NYSE,
"with a combined global market cap of $3.8 trillion, or about 30% of the
total exchange."' 44 If these companies decide to leave the NYSE (or are
de-listed by the SEC for violating Section 301 of SOX), U.S. investors will
find it more difficult to invest in foreign companies, thereby decreasing
their ability to obtain more diversified portfolios. 45
The next section provides some specific examples of how compliance
with both SOX and foreign laws may impose a hardship on foreign
companies and/or place them in a no-win, catch-22 situation.
D. SOX on a Collision Course with Foreign Laws and Practices
Compliance with SOX may be burdensome to companies already
complying with similar foreign laws, 146 or may put such companies in a
position where they must violate foreign laws. This section samples some
relevant foreign laws and discusses how they may pose compliance
problems for foreign companies that are subject to SOX. Subsection 1
describes the E.U. policy on data protection and how it may conflict with
SOX. Subsections 2 and 3 discuss various French and German laws,
142. Id.
143. It should be noted that, at the time of this writing, the NYSE and Euronext are in the
process of merging. Roberta S. Karmel, NYSE-Euronext Merger: NYSE Is Losing Listings to
Foreign Exchanges, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 17, 2006, at 3. However, the two exchanges, the SEC,
and E.U. officials have all insisted that this merger will not subject Euronext-listed
companies to SEC regulation. Id. ("The CEOs of both the NYSE and Euronext have stated
that U.S. accounting regulations would not be extended to European companies as a result of
the NYSE-Euronext merger... [and the SEC] has attempted to reassure foreign issuers
listed on Euronext that they will not become subject to the SEC reporting requirements
merely because they are listed on Euronext."). In addition, in discussing the "implications of
a possible combination of Nasdaq and the London Stock Exchange... [SEC chairman
Christopher] Cox said that [the] different countries were likely to continue to have different
regulatory standards." Jeremy Grant, SEC, Euronext to Discuss NYSE Plans, Fin. Times
(U.S.), Aug. 4, 2006, at 16.
144. Falencki, supra note 87, at 1234.
145. Id.
146. For example, the regulatory approach adopted by the United Kingdom overlaps with
the new rules imposed by SOX to such a significant degree that additional compliance with
SOX by U.K. companies would be unnecessarily duplicative. See Falencki, supra note 87, at
1225-26. The key difference between the two approaches is that whereas the U.S system is
based on mandatory legislative standards, the U.K. approach relies on voluntary compliance
through observance of U.K. law on a "comply or explain" basis. Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron
and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Governance
and Disclosure Regimes, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 725, 743 (2005). That is, if companies do not
comply with U.K. law, then they are required to explain this departure in company reports
and statements, leaving "shareholders and others to judge the effects of this action." Id.
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respectively, and how they pose problems for foreign companies who must
comply with SOX in addition to their home country laws.
1. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
In 1995, the European Union adopted Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC (the "Directive"). 147 According to the Directive, member states
must protect their citizens' "fundamental rights and freedoms," particularly
the right to privacy regarding the processing of personal data.' 48 Among
other things, the Directive requires that personal data must be
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes...;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected... ;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date...;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were
collected .... 149
Moreover, the Directive states that personal data may be processed only
if the data subject has given his unambiguous consent. 150 The data subject
must be provided with the identity of the controller 151 and the intended
purposes of the data processing. 152 Not only must the data subject be
granted access, without excessive delay or expense, to any personal
information held by another party, but he must also be given the
opportunity to correct any inaccurate information. 153
In addition to establishing a comprehensive system to protect privacy
rights, the Directive also imposes restrictions on the transfer of personal
information out of Europe. 154 Transfer of such information may take place
only if the country of destination "ensures an adequate level of
protection.... The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a
[destination] country shall be assessed in ... light of all the circumstances
surrounding a data transfer operation."' 55 The Commission has indicated
that current U.S. law does not provide an "adequate" level of privacy rights
147. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive].
148. Id. art. 1.
149. Id. art. 6.
150. Id. art. 7.
151. "Controller" refers to the "person, public authority, agency or any other body [that]
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data." Id. art. 2(d).
152. Id. art. 10.
153. Id. art. 12.
154. Id. art. 25.
155. Id. art. 25(1)-(2).
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protection for purposes of article 25 of the Directive. 156 Therefore, this
provision could pose serious problems for companies subject to SOX,
which may frequently require the transfer of personal information outside of
Europe. 157
Article 28 of the Directive states that each member state must adopt
legislation creating one or more public authorities to implement the
Directive within its territory. 158 Each authority must be endowed with
investigative powers,' 59 effective powers of intervention,160 and the power
to engage in legal proceedings for violations of the national provisions
adopted pursuant to the Directive. 161 The result of this provision is that
twenty-five different sets of laws governing data protection will be on the
books in the European Union, any one of which could render compliance
with SOX problematic. 162
2. Conflict Between SOX and French Law
This subsection describes how French law may conflict with SOX's
anonymous whistleblower hotline requirement. Subsection 2.a deals with
the conflict with French labor law, whereas subsection 2.b deals with the
conflict with French data protection law.
a. Labor Law
French labor law rules require an information and consultation process
with the personnel representatives (e.g., works council) prior to the
adoption and modification of internal regulations. 163 These regulations
must be posted for inspection by the employees and then filed with the clerk
of the appropriate labor law court and the appropriate labor inspector. 164
With regard to ethics hotlines and codes of conduct, French labor law
156. Currently, the European Union has designated only Argentina, Canada, Hungary,
and Switzerland as providing adequate protection of personal data. Justin Kent Holcombe,
Solutions for Regulating Offshore Outsourcing in the Service Sector: Using the Law,
Market, International Mechanisms, and Collective Organization as Building Blocks, 7 U. Pa.
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 539, 571 (2005).
157. E.g., SOX § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (Supp. II 2002) (requiring procedures for
"the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by" issuers, as well as
procedures for confidential, anonymous whistleblowing).
158. Directive, supra note 147, art. 28(1).
159. Id. art. 28(3).
160. One example of an effective power of intervention is "delivering opinions before
processing operations are carried out." Id.
161. Id.
162. See infra Part I.D.2.b. (discussing the conflict between France's data protection law
and SOX's whistleblower-hotline requirement).
163. 2 Moquet Borde Dieux et al., Doing Business in France § 12.03(6)(b)(i) (citing C.
Tray., art. L.122-36(1)).
164. See id. (citing Code du travail [C. tray.] arts. L.122-36(3), R.122-12, R.122-13 (Fr.)).
Labor inspectors may review the legality of the regulation and at any time may require
companies to remove or modify provisions that conflict with applicable labor law. Id. (citing
Code du travail [C. trav.] art. L.122-37(l)).
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provides that restrictions on individual and collective freedoms are unlawful
if they are disproportionate to the aim sought and are "not justified by the
nature of the task."' 165
In addition, although the French Labor Code contains specific protective
provisions for employees who have denounced moral harassment to their
employers, no such protection exists for employees who denounce
frauds. 166 in contrast, a false denunciation may subject an employee to
fines and imprisonment. 167 As of yet, French labor courts have not reported
any cases involving the implementation of anonymous whistleblower
hotlines. However, applying recent French civil court decisions, French
labor courts may, as they have done with regard to monitoring Internet and
e-mail use, 168 deem obligations to report coworkers as being a
disproportionate restriction on employees' individual rights and
freedoms. 169
b. Data Protection Laws
This subsection deals with the conflict between France's data protection
law and SOX's requirement for confidential and anonymous whistleblower
hotlines. Subsection 2.b.i deals with the French CNIL, while subsection
2.b.ii discusses two recent CNIL decisions rejecting the implementation of
anonymous whistleblower hotlines in French subsidiaries of American
companies. Subsection 2.b.iii analyzes the source of France's aversion to
anonymous whistleblowing. Finally, subsection 2.b.iv discusses the
CNIL's attempt to reach a compromise regarding SOX's whistleblower
hotline requirement.
165. French Employee Data Protection and Labour Law Conflicts with Sarbanes-Oxley,
Dechert On Point (Dechert LLP, London), Sept. 19, 2005, at 2 [hereinafter Dechert] (citing
Code du travail [C. tray.] arts. L.120-2, 122-35).
166. Id. (citing Code du travail [C. trav.] art. L.122-49).
167. Id. (citing Code penal [C. p~n.] art. L.226-10).
168. See, e.g., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Nanterre, Oct. 6, 2004, no. 04/02865 [hereinafter Novartis Case], available at
http://www.juripole.fr/J20041006.php. An unofficial English translation is available at
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.juripole.fr/J20041006.php
&prev=/search%3Fq%3DNovartis%2B%2526%2BNanterre%2B%26start%3D 10%26h1%3
Den%261r%3D%26ie%3DUTF-8%26sa%3DN].
169. For example, in the Novartis Case, Novartis adopted a code of conduct outlining the
standards that employees were required to meet in relation to "personal obligations,
discrimination, conflict of interest, bribes, insider dealing, competition, legal compliance and
duties of confidentiality." Eva Wong, Implementing Codes of Conduct, Privacy & Data
Protection, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 5, 6. The Civil Court of Nanterre (Tribunal de Grande
Instance) concluded that the code of conduct was an amendment to the company's internal
regulations and illicitly intruded into the private life of the company's employees. Id. It then
ordered Novartis to remove its code of conduct from its internal regulations and from its
intranet, or face a E 100,000 fine for each day it remained. See Novartis Case, supra note
168.
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i. The French CNIL
First enacted in 1978, the French Data Protection Act 170 -which created
the "Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes" (CNIL)-was
recently amended to transpose the Directive into French law. 171 Under
French law as it now stands, 172 data must be collected and handled "fairly
and lawfully."'173 This data should be adequate, pertinent, and not excessive
with regards to the purpose for its collection. 174 Moreover, inaccurate or
incomplete data must be deleted or rectified, and the individual concerned
must have the opportunity to access and correct such data.175
Data collection, sharing, and disclosure may be established by way of a
company's code of conduct. 176 However, whistleblowing hotlines must
comply with both French law and European codes, particularly the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Data Processing of Personal Data 177 as well as Directive 95/46/EC. 178
Although French law requires employees to alert the authorities of
suspected financial improprieties, French labor law does not protect an
employee's job security because the whistleblower's dismissal may be
justified under the principles of "obligations to respect confidentiality, link
of subordination, and abuse of freedom on expression."' 79
ii. Two Recent CNIL Decisions
Seeking to comply with the newly enacted SOX requirements, the French
subsidiaries of two American companies 180 approached the CNIL seeking
approval for the establishment of anonymous whistleblowing procedures.
On May 26, 2005, the CNIL denied the requests of both McDonald's
France and Exide Technologies, applying the same reasoning in both
instances. 1 81
The McDonald's "professional integrity" plan would have allowed the
employees of McDonald's France to report, either by mail or by fax, any
170. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227.
171. Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 14063.
172. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004
[hereinafter French Data Protection Law]. The English version of the French Data
Protection Law is available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/uk/78-17VA.pdf.
173. French Data Protection Law, supra note 172, art. 6.
174. Id.
175. Id. art. 40.
176. Mark E. Schreiber et al., Anonymous Sarbanes-Oxley Hotline in the E. U: Practical
Compliance Guidance for Global Companies, World Data Protection Rep. (BNA Int'l,
Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2005, at 1. 6.
177. Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108.
178. Schreiber, supra note 176, at 6.
179. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. The two American companies are McDonald's Corporation and Exide Technologies.
181. See administrative decisions cited supra note 5.
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inappropriate conduct of the restaurants' management to the American
parent company.182 After receiving the contents of the mail or faxes from
the Ethics Director, the management of McDonald's France would
investigate complaints involving its employees; however, the parent
company would investigate any complaints involving the management of
McDonald's France. 183 Suspected employees would be informed "that they
ha[d] the right to access, rectify or contest within two business days" the
reports made against them. 184 If the investigation revealed employee
misconduct, the content of the computerized reports would be stored with
McDonald's France for a period ranging from one to five years, depending
on the nature of the fault committed.185 Finally, the reports stored with the
Ethics Department of the parent company would be kept no longer than
three months after the close of an investigation; however, where members
of McDonald's France management were implicated, the information would
be kept no longer than five years. 186
Exide Technologies hoped to implement an "ethics hotline" that would
enable employees to report accounting inaccuracies or irregularities,
"possible violations of company principles (rules of ethical or commercial
conduct) or of laws currently in force."' 187 Such reports were to be made
either by email or by calling a toll-free number, and an employee's
anonymity was guaranteed if so requested. 188 In actuality, reports and
information requests were addressed to an American subcontractor, which
was responsible for recording and classifying their contents. 189 Depending
upon the classification, a written summary of the reports would be sent to
the appropriate person as previously designated by the parent company. 190
If deemed necessary, the recipient would then begin an internal
investigation. 191 "Finally, the data would be kept for a maximum of one
year."1 92
182. McDonald's Decision, supra note 5. The contents of these reports would be
recorded in a central file under the control of the Director of Ethics of the company. Id.
Originally, McDonald's had planned to install an ethics hotline and a dedicated email
address; however, after discussions with the CNIL, it decided to use a postal address and
U.S. fax number instead. Miriam Wugmeister & Daniel P. Westman, Whistle-blowing Lines:
Conflicting Obligations, Mondaq, July 8, 2005,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=33612&searchresults= 1.
183. Wugmeister & Westman, supra note 182.
184. McDonald's Decision, supra note 5.
185. Id. On the other hand, reports that did not result in an investigation or that led to
negative results were to be destroyed within two business days of the final decision. Id.
186. Id.
187. Exide Decision, supra note 5.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. "A 'file follow-up' would also be sent, via e-mail, by the parent company to the
French General Counsel, who would in turn send this on to the French Human Resources
Director." Id.
192. Id.
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Using the exact same language in both cases, the CNIL rejected the
proposed whistleblowing procedures of both companies. 193  First, it
asserted that the possibility of establishing an "ethics alert" could only
bolster "the risk of slanderous denunciations." 194  The CNIL then
concluded that the objectives sought by such anonymous systems are
disproportionate to the risks of slanderous denunciations and of
stigmatizing the subjects of such alerts. 195 Finally, the CNIL noted that, by
definition, employees subject to such alerts would not be informed as soon
as the report is recorded, and may thus lack the means necessary to contest
the processing of the relevant data. 196
iii. French Aversion to Whistleblowing
The implementation of anonymous hotlines in France in accordance with
SOX poses a cultural problem as well. Slanderous denunciation from
anonymous accusers is contrary to French historical and social principles.
The French aversion to anonymous whistleblowing dates back to the French
Revolution, during which there was a practice called the "lettres de cachet."
Under this practice, people could be anonymously denounced as enemies
and sent off to the guillotine.
Moreover, during the Nazi occupation of France, anonymous
denunciations to the Gestapo and police were commonly used to persecute
religious and ethnic minorities as well as personal enemies. 197 Therefore,
in the eyes of French courts and citizens, an anonymous reporter is viewed
as an "informer."' 198 In fact, one such ethical hotline implemented by a
different American company's subsidiary has reportedly been referred to as
"allo collabo," the term for informers to the Nazis. 199
iv. CNIL Guidelines for Whistleblowing Schemes
Conscious of the difficulties its McDonald's and Exide decisions posed
for SOX compliance, the CNIL adopted a document of orientation setting
forth guidelines for the proper implementation of such whistleblowing
schemes.200 The CNIL declared that, although it had refused to authorize
193. See administrative decisions cited supra note 5.
194. See administrative decisions cited supra note 5.
195. See administrative decisions cited supra note 5.
196. See administrative decisions cited supra note 5.
197. Dechert, supra note 165, at 1 n.3.
198. Schreiber, supra note 176, at 6-7.
199. During World War II, "collabo" was the nickname used to refer to French citizens
who collaborated with the Nazis. Mark E. Schreiber et al., Anonymous Sarbanes-Oxley
Hotlines for Multi-National Companies: Compliance with E. U. Data Protection Laws V-9-
1. V-9-25. in 2 The Practitioner's Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxlev Act (John J. Huber et al. eds.,
2004).
200. CNIL, Guideline Document Adopted by the "Commission Nationale de
L'informatique et des Libert~s" (CNIL) on 10 November 2005 for the Implementation of
Whistleblowing Systems in Compliance with the French Data Protection Act of 6 January
1978, as Amended in August 2004, Relating to Information Technology, Data Filing
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two specific whistleblowing schemes, it had no objection to such schemes
in principle, provided that they are consistent with French data protection
rules. 201
In some circumstances, the implementation of whistleblowing procedures
may be justified out of necessity. 202  Provided that other rules
recommended by the CNIL are followed, the CNIL will approve
whistleblowing procedures that are limited in scope.203 However, the CNIL
will analyze procedures that are "not based on statutory or regulatory
obligations of internal control in the financial, accounting, banking and anti
bribery areas" on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
proportionality of the contemplated whistleblowing procedures and the
purposes for which they are sought are legitimate.204 Finally, employees
must not be required to use a legitimately implemented whistleblowing
system. 205
Where anonymous reports are concerned, however, the CNIL has not
wavered from its position given in the McDonald's and Exide decisions. In
the eyes of the CNIL, anonymous reporting can only increase the risk of
slanderous reports, while requiring identification prior to reporting can only
reduce such a risk by increasing the responsibility of reporters.206
Therefore, whistleblowing systems must be designed in ways that require
employees to identify themselves every time they make a report.20 7
However, this does not mean that whistleblowers will be unprotected under
such a scheme. To the contrary, an employee's identity will be processed in
Systems and Liberties [hereinafter CNIL Guidelines], available at http://cnil-
front I .heb.fr.colt.net/fileadmin/documents/uk/CNIL-recommandations-whistleblowing-
VA.pdf.
201. Id. at-1.
202. Id. at 2. The procedures should be viewed merely as complementary to other
reporting methods, not as an equivalent to such methods. Id. Moreover, whistleblowing
procedures must be limited in scope (i.e., because of a French legislative or regulatory
obligation to implement such procedures or because of a legitimate interest of the data
controller required for processing, so long as the fundamental rights and liberties of the
person concerned are respected). Id.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 4. In a letter sent to the CNIL, the French Minister for Labor and Social
Affairs stated that "the use of whistleblowing systems must not be compulsory, but be merely
encouraged.... It can be argued also that a compulsory reporting requirement would
breach article L120-2 of the Labor Code as a requirement out of proportion with its
objective." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Id. The CNIL points to several advantages of "identified reports," including (1)
preventing an increase in slanderous reporting; (2) allowing a company to organize, in
advance, a scheme protecting the whistleblower against any possible retaliation; and (3)
providing for more efficient processing of such reports due to the ability to request additional
information from the reporter. Id.
207. See id. at 4-5 (stating that companies "must not encourage [users of] the system to do
so anonymously .... On the contrary, the procedure must be designed in such a way that
the employees using the system are requested to identify themselves each time they make an
alert"). In addition, employees should provide data relating to facts, rather than to persons.
Id.
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a confidential manner and will not be disclosed to the incriminated
individual.208
The CNIL guidelines also set up rules regarding notice, data retention,
and the transfer of data across borders. A person incriminated by a report
must be notified as soon as the data concerning him is recorded. 20 9
Information relating to a report later deemed to be unsubstantiated must be
destroyed immediately. 210 Moreover, data relating to reports that required
verification should be kept no longer than two months after verification has
been completed. 211 Finally, Directive 95/46/EC forbids the transfer of
personal data to non-European countries that lack the protective measures
described above.212 Thus, a conflict may arise if the United States is
deemed to be lacking in these protective measures.
The following subsection deals with how German corporate and labor
laws may make the adoption of certain SOX provisions very difficult and
costly. The potential conflict between German, labor law and the
implementation of SOX provisions is similar to the conflict between French
labor law and the implementation of SOX whistleblower hotlines.2 13
3. Conflict Between SOX and German Law
a. Corporate Law
Under German law, three types of corporate entities exist: the
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH), the Aktiengesellschaflen
(AG)214 and the Kommanditgesellschaft aufAktien (KGaA). 215 The AG has
208. Id. at 4. This remains true even in light of the accused person's right to access
information concerning him. See French Data Protection Law, supra note 172, art. 39.
Articles 39 and 40 of the Data Protection Act allow a person identified through the
whistleblowing scheme to access his data and, if applicable, to request its rectification or
deletion. Id. arts. 39-40. This right of access, however, does not entitle the individual to
request the disclosure of data concerning third parties, such as the identity of the
whistleblower. CNIL Guidelines, supra note 200, at 7.
209. CNIL Guidelines, supra note 200, at 6. Notification enables the implicated person to
promptly object to the processing of his data. Id. However, a person should not be informed
until the necessary protective measures have been taken to ensure that no relevant evidence
is destroyed. Id. at 7.
210. Id. at 6.
211. Id. This rule could pose problems for accounting firms attempting to comply with
Section 802(a) of SOX, which requires that "[any accountant who conducts an audit of an
issuer of securities to which section 1 OA(a) of the Securities Exchange Act ... applies, shall
maintain all audit or review workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the fiscal
period in which the audit or review was concluded." 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (Supp. 112002).
212. Directive, supra note 147, art. 25; CNIL Guidelines, supra note 200, at 6.
213. See supra Part I.D.2.a.
214. This is an entity that is independent of its shareholders, much like a U.S. corporation.
Naidu, supra note 80, at 281.
215. Id. at 280. While both the Aktiengesellschaften AG and the Kommanditgesellschaft
aufAktien KGaA are stock corporations, the KGaA is less common as a result of its liability
structure. Id. at 280-81. Both types of corporations are governed by the German Stock
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a two-tiered board structure which consists of the Vorstand ("Managing
Board") and the Aufsichtsrat ("Supervisory Board"), membership on each
being mutually exclusive.216 The Managing Board is comprised of the
corporate officers and is responsible for running the company. 217 The
Supervisory Board, on the other hand, is comprised of inside directors,
outside directors, and labor union and employee representatives. 218 This
board, whose members are elected by the AG's shareholders, is responsible
for supervising the Managing Board and for appointing and removing its
members.21 9 Because representatives of the large German banks generally
comprise the Supervisory Board, an interlocking network exists among
Supervisory Boards within Germany. 220
This two-tiered corporate governance structure causes compliance
problems with Section 301 of SOX in numerous respects. First of all, SOX
requires that members of the audit committee-which for German issuers
would be the Supervisory Board-be independent.2 21 This requirement is
problematic for German issuers because German law requires that, in
addition to containing at least one labor representative, one-third of the
Supervisory Board must consist of employee representatives. 222
Acknowledging that German companies do not meet SOX's independence
requirements, the SEC proposed a limited exemption in its Final Rule 33-
8220,223 which would allow employees to serve on the Supervisory Board
so long as they are not executive officers. 224 Moreover, nonexecutive
Corporation Act (GSCA), which deals with issues covered by U.S. securities laws and stock
exchange rules. The GSCA, however, is primarily interested in protecting creditors. Id. at
281.
216. Id. at 281-82.
217. Sabyasachi Ghoshray, Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed Corporations:
Conflicts in Comparative Corporate Laws and Possible Remedies, 10 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 447, 455 (2004).
218. Id.
219. Naidu, supra note 80, at 282. Moreover, in addition to examining and approving the
corporation's annual financial statements, the Supervisory Board also calls shareholder
meetings and approves specified acts of management. Id.
220. Id.
221. SOX § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. 112002) ("Each member of the
audit committee of the issuer shall be ... independent.... [T]o be considered...
independent.., a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not... accept any
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or be an affiliated person of
the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.").
222. Naidu, supra note 80, at 282.
223. Final Rule: Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities
Act Release No. 8220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,001, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8220].
224. Id. at 18,802. The Exchange Act Rule defines executive officer as follows:
its president, any vice president of the registrant in charge of a principal business
unit, division or fimction (such as sales, administration or finance), any other
officer who performs a policy making function or any other person who performs
similar policy making functions for the registrant. Executive officers of
subsidiaries may be deemed executive officers of the registrant if they perform
such policy making functions for the registrant.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (2005).
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employees would be permitted to sit on the audit committee of a foreign
private issuer if they are elected or named to that issuer's board of directors
or audit committee pursuant to its issuer's governing law or documents, a
collective bargaining agreement, or other legal or listing requirements of its
home country. 225  As a result, companies that are required to have
employees or union representatives on their Supervisory Board will no
longer be in violation of SOX's independence requirement. However, the
inclusion of bank representatives who serve as executive officers on the
Supervisory Boards of German issuers226 is incompatible with SOX's
independence requirements. 227
In addition, the SEC's final rule clarifies that the Supervisory Board is
best equipped to comply with SOX's audit requirements. 228 If the entire
Supervisory Board is considered independent, as defined by SOX, then it
can be designated as the audit committee; otherwise, it may form a separate
audit committee which meets the independence requirements. 229 However,
compliance with SOX would impose significant restructuring costs on
German issuers because the German corporate structure currently delegates
auditing responsibility to the Managing Board.230
German issuers also run into difficulty with SOX's certification
requirements, 23' the violation of which may result in criminal penalty. 232
For example, unlike U.S. corporate structure, which provides for numerous
executive officers who ultimately report to, and are subordinate to, the
company's CEO, German companies lack the equivalent of a U.S. CEO. 233
Rather, decisions are made by the board as a whole, and if one member
disagrees with a decision, either the decision is not made or that member
must leave.234 Consequently, some have argued that because "'it is the
management board, and not the individuals comprising it, that is ultimately
responsible for management of the company,"' an SEC requirement forcing
225. Release No. 33-8220, supra note 223, at 18,802.
226. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
227. Naidu, supra note 80, at 296-97.
228. Release No. 33-8220, supra note 223, at 18,802.
229. Id.
230. Naidu, supra note 80, at 297.
231. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002) (requiring that the CEO and CFO, or
persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report that, among
other things, the signing officer has reviewed the report and that the report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made not misleading); 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a)-(b) ("Each periodic report containing
financial statements filed by an issuer with the Securities Exchange Commission... shall be
accompanied by a written statement by the [issuer's] chief executive officer and chief
financial officer (or equivalent thereof). . . certify[ing] that the periodic report ... fully
complies with the ... Securities Exchange Act ... and that information contained in the
periodic report fairly presents ... the financial condition ... of the issuer.").
232. See 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (providing criminal penalties for violating the provision's
certification requirements).
233. Falencki, supra note 87, at 1227.
234. Naidu, supra note 80, at 293.
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"'specific members of the management board to shoulder additional
liability on behalf of others"' would be inappropriate. 235
b. Labor Law
The conflict between SOX whistleblower provisions and German Labor
law was demonstrated in a case involving Wal-Mart (the "Wal-Mart
case"). 236 The Wal-Mart works council brought suit against Wal-Mart in
the Labor Court of Wuppertal seeking to cease the operation of the code of
conduct telephone hotline. 237 The works council argued that the operation
of such a hotline was subject to a codetermination right and thus required
the consent of the Wal-Mart works council. 238 The court held that such a
whistleblower clause in the code of conduct "affect[s] the order within the
company and also the conduct of the individual employee within the
company," and thus requires the consent of the works council to be valid.239
The conflict here between SOX whistleblower hotline requirements and
German labor law thus appears to be more procedural than substantive.
Nothing inherent in whistleblower hotlines violates German labor laws. 240
Rather, it is the manner of implementation that may run afoul of the law.
Had Wal-Mart first approached the works council and obtained its approval
for the hotline, the hotline would be legitimate (at least with regard to
German labor laws).
Before determining whether foreign companies should be penalized for
noncompliance with various SOX provisions due to inconsistency with the
235. Falencki, supra note 87, at 1227 (quoting a letter sent to the SEC by the law firm
Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP).
236. Arbeitsgericht Wuppertal [ArbG] [Labour Court of Wuppertal] June 15, 2005, 5 BV
20/05 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter WalMart Case], translated at
http://www.faegre.com/articles/downform2.asp?doc-num = 1 &aid = 1691 (last visited Oct. 10,
2006).
237. Id. The code of conduct hotlines were in place to encourage employees to use it to
report anonymously ethical misconduct or any violation of the company's internal code of
conduct by coworkers. Id.
238. World Law Group, Unofficial English Translation of German WalMart Code of
Conduct Decision, http://www.theworldlawgroup.com/newsletter/details.asp?ID=74555728
2005 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). Works councils retain codetermination rights in situations
where the council has joint decision-making authority, such as matters regarding the
establishment's rules of operation and the conduct of the establishment's employees. See
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution Act], Sept. 25, 2001, BGB1. I at
2518, § 87 para. 1 (F.R.G.), translated in B. Ruster, Business Transactions in Germany, app.
10 (Christian Campbell et al. eds. 2005). Usually, management will obtain the works
council's consent by agreeing upon a works agreement. See id. § 77 para. 2. If such an
agreement is not reached, the matter will be decided by an arbitrator. See id. § 76. Decisions
made by management lacking the required contributions of the works council are invalid and
need not be followed by employees. See 3 Riister, supra, § 29.06(1)(a) n.10 (2006).
239. WalMart Case, supra note 236, at 10.
240. That is, German labor law, when viewed in isolation, does not itself prohibit the
implementation of an anonymous whistleblowing procedure. See Schreiber, supra note 176,
at 6.
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laws of their home countries, a brief discussion of analogous situations
regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws may prove helpful.
E. Other Controversial U.S. Laws Applied Abroad
This section discusses two other U.S. laws which have been applied
extraterritorially by U.S. courts, and describes the various ways that courts
have dealt with situations involving conflicts between these laws and the
laws of fellow sovereign nations. 241  Subsection I describes the
extraterritorial treatment of the antitrust laws; subsection 2 deals with the
extraterritorial reach of the discovery laws.
1. U.S. Antitrust Law
Early courts framed antitrust issues involving extraterritorial analysis in
terms of legislative jurisdiction, i.e., whether Congress intended the
antitrust laws to apply to anticompetitive conduct abroad. Such analysis
required the court to analyze the statute to determine Congress's intent. For
example, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated that "in case of doubt to a construction of any
statute [it should] be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."242 This
approach to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, known as the
"strict territoriality" principle, would confine the reach of such laws to the
U.S. borders unless Congress undoubtedly meant for them to be applied
abroad.
A second approach to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws involves the
"effects" test. This approach was most famously articulated by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa").243
Although the defendants were foreign companies with no direct connection
to the United States, Judge Hand held that the Sherman Act was applicable
because the agreement had a direct effect upon the United States and its
241. The term "conflict" is being used broadly in this sentence to refer to situations where(1) U.S. law prohibits a foreign company (as defined supra note 2) from engaging in conduct
abroad that would otherwise be perfectly legal under the laws of the nation in which it is to
take place; (2) U.S. law requires a foreign company to engage in conduct that would cause it
to violate a law of its home country, or of some other country, and (3) compliance with U.S.
law would be overly burdensome to foreign companies due to the current status of their
home country law (e.g., compliance would result in significant corporate restructuring, or
would subject companies to duplicative legislation). See infra text accompanying note 258
for a discussion on the term "true conflict."
242. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); see also EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("We assume that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality."); Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
243. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In this case, a Swiss corporation composed of six
foreign aluminum ingot producers was organized for the purpose of fixing quotas for
aluminum ingots. Id. at 442.
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foreign commerce, and was intended to affect U.S. domestic and foreign
commerce. 244 In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Hand said that the
court's role was to determine whether Congress intended for the Act to
apply to extraterritorial activities. 245 Thus, Alcoa, like American Banana,
assumed that Congress intended to respect the limits imposed by
international comity246 and international conflict of laws principles on
legislative jurisdiction.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America247 added a balancing
approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction equation. After determining that
"[t]he effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other
nations' interests," 248 the court suggested that, in an international setting, it
must also consider whether the "interests of, and links to, the United
States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign
commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-d-vis those of other nations, to
justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority. '249  The court in
Timberlane thus made international comity analysis (i.e., interest balancing)
and the effects test of Alcoa prerequisites to the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.250 Other courts soon re-characterized the extraterritoriality
analysis as one of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., whether federal courts
had the power to hear cases involving foreign conduct, and separated
244. See id. at 443-44. Judge Learned Hand's decision, coming at a time of intense
international friction in the aftermath of World War II, "reflected a growing concern that
State or national boundaries might shield perpetrators from the law when the effect of
misconduct created injuries beyond the reach of the local jurisdiction .... [This decision
enabled the United States] to protect U.S. markets against conduct occurring in foreign
territory." Susan E. Burnett, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-
Laroche? Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust, 18
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 555, 571 (2004).
245. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. Judge Hand refused to impute to Congress an intention to
violate international conflict-of-law rules, stating "[w]e should not impute to Congress an
intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within
the United States." Id.
246. "International comity is a doctrine that counsels voluntary forbearance when a
sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes that a second sovereign also
has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law." United States v.
Nippon Paper Indus. Co:, 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997).
247. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
248. Id. at 611-12.
249. Id. at613.
250. Id. at 613-14. The court identified seven factors to be weighed when conducting the
interest balancing test:
[1] the degree of conflict with foreign law... , [2] the nationality... of the
parties and the ... principal places of businesses. . . , [3] the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, [4] the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, [5]
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
[6] the foreseeability of such effect, and [7] the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.
Id. at 614.
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international comity considerations from the effects test.251 According to
these courts, subject matter jurisdiction was first established through
application of the "intended effects" test of Alcoa.2 52  After a court
determines that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it must resort to the
principles of international comity to determine whether it should exercise
this jurisdiction. 253  In determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be exercised, courts will conduct an extensive inquiry involving the
balancing of a number of competing factors, 2 54 the outcome of which may
differ depending on the particular circumstances involved. 255
The majority opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California256
added a further wrinkle to subject matter jurisdiction analysis to
extraterritoriality. According to Justice David Souter, principles of
international comity should only be considered in situations where a "true
conflict" exists between foreign and domestic law. 257 He also concluded
that a "true conflict" does not exist unless a person is subject to the
inconsistent laws of two countries, both of which cannot simultaneously be
complied with.258 Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, argued that issues
concerning the extraterritoriality of U.S. law should be analyzed in terms of
legislative jurisdiction.259  He argued that courts must distinguish the
question of whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the case from the
251. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir.
1979) ("The challenge here is to conduct by an American corporation in a foreign country,
arguably legal there, and the issue is whether that activity is answerable in the courts of the
United States under the Sherman Act's broad and potentially far-reaching language.").
252. Id. at 1291-92.
253. Id. at 1296 (noting that while the right to a remedy might be clear in a purely
domestic situation, "[wihen foreign nations are involved ... it is unwise to ignore the fact
that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power are considerations
that should have a bearing on the decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction"); see McBee v.
Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993) for the proposition that "comity considerations, such as whether relief
ordered by an American court would conflict with foreign law, were properly understood not
as questions of whether a United States court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, but
instead as issues of whether a court should decline to exercise the jurisdiction that it
possessed").
254. In addition to the factors mentioned in Timberlane, see supra note 250, courts should
also consider the following: (a) the "[a]vailability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of
litigation there;" (b) the "[p]ossible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises
jurisdiction and grants relief;" (c) whether the exercise of jurisdiction and granting of relief
will place a party "in the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country
or be under conflicting requirements by both countries;" (d) "[w]hether the court can make
its order effective;" and (e) "[w]hether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the
issue." Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
255. Id. at 1298 ("[T]he extensive inquiry required [need not] yield the same answer in
each instance [because the] legislation and policy of each nation is not likely to be the same,
nor is it probable that the effect upon commerce in each instance will be as substantial as
others.").
256. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
257. Id. at 798-99.
258. Id. at 799.
259. Id. at812.
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question of whether the law reaches the extraterritorial conduct that is
alleged.2 60 In determining the extent to which Congress has exercised its
legislative jurisdiction, Scalia would apply two canons of statutory
construction: (1) a presumption against extraterritorial application of the
statute, and (2) a presumption that it was not the intention of Congress to
violate principles of international law.261 Applying the international law
presumption, Justice Scalia argued that the scope of the antitrust laws
should be interpreted consistently with the principles of international
comity and international conflict of laws.262
2. International Discovery: Comity Analysis Used in Situations of Conflict
In adjudicating cases, especially those international in nature, U.S. courts
frequently require evidence that is located abroad. 263 However, U.S. courts
seeking to obtain such evidence often are faced with barriers. For example,
a number of countries, such as Switzerland, have bank secrecy laws that
prevent foreign banks from releasing information to U.S. courts.264 Other
countries, in response to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, have
enacted blocking statutes making it illegal to send evidence to the United
States. 265  Blocking laws generally embody "national interests in
prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of documents
located in the territory of the enacting state. They cannot be waived by
private parties because they protect national interests ... rather than private
interests." 266
In many instances, U.S. courts have held that defendants in a U.S. action
may not refuse to comply with discovery orders despite the fact that
compliance would violate foreign laws.267 The rationale for such decisions
is that a party that conducts international business and subjects itself to
260. Id. In Justice Antonin Scalia's view, the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach "has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substantive law turning
on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the
challenged conduct." Id. at 813.
261. Id. at 814-15. In Scalia's view, although the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act has been overcome by precedent, the international law
presumption is still relevant to determining the statute's substantive reach because customary
international law places limits on a nation's exercise of its legislative jurisdiction, and
Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those limits. Id.
262. Id.
263. See supra Part I.A.4.
264. See Pitt, supra note 124, at 404-11.
265. See id. at 411-15.
266. Michael A. Gerstenzang, Insider Trading and the Internationalization of the
Securities Markets, 27 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 409, 421 (1989). For example, "[tlhe French
blocking law (No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980) ... forbids nationals, and certain others with ties
to France, from divulging economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters to
foreign authorities except as provided by international agreement." Id. at 423.
267. E.g., SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(ordering a Swiss bank to respond to the SEC's interrogatories).
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conflicting laws must thereafter bear the burden of such a conflict. 268
However, defendants finding themselves in such catch-22 situations will
not always be forced to comply with U.S. discovery orders; rather, U.S.
courts generally conduct a comity analysis prior to determining whether to
exercise their enforcement jurisdiction.269
In general, when two countries have jurisdiction to, and actually do,
prescribe and enforce rules of law that require inconsistent conduct,
international law requires that each country, in good faith, consider
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in light of factors
such as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the
nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose
upon the person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality of the person,
and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.270
Part II of this Note addresses how the SEC (and U.S. courts) may
respond to a request for relief from the penalties of SOX (e.g., delisting or
criminal sanctions) made by a company that violated a SOX provision that
268. E.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 905 (2d Cir. 1968)
("[Slurely an American corporation cannot insulate itself from a federal Grand Jury
investigation by entering into a contract with an American bank abroad requiring bank
secrecy. If indeed Citibank might suffer civil liability under German law in such
circumstances, it must confront the choice [between] the need to surrender to one sovereign
or the other the privileges received therefrom or, alternatively a willingness to accept the
consequences." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
269. E.g., Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1279-81 (7th Cir. 1990) (conducting a comity analysis in a situation where a defendant, by
producing evidence to an American court, would be subject to potential criminal sanctions
for being in violation of Romanian law); Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 117-19.
A number of factors are relevant to any comity analysis in the context of a district court's
power to order foreign discovery in the face of objections by foreign states. These factors
include
(1) the importance to the ...litigation of the documents or other information
requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing
the information; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Reinsurance, 902 F.2d at 1279-80. After balancing the "vital national interests" of
the United States and Romania, the court determined that Romania's interest appeared to be
"more immediate and compelling." Id. at 1280-81. The court also noted that district courts,
in their discretion, "may require a good faith effort from the parties to seek a waiver of any
blocking provisions." Id. at 1282 (citing as examples In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691
F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982) and United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d
341, 346-47 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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conflicted 271 with foreign law. In doing so, many of the theories discussed
above in the context of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act
and U.S. discovery laws will be drawn upon by way of analogy.
II. ON A COLLISION COURSE, SOX TRAIN REACHES A JUNCTION AND
MUST SELECT THE PROPER ROUTE: VARIOUS APPROACHES TO HANDLING
FOREIGN REQUESTS FOR RELIEF
This part lays out the various approaches that the SEC 272 could adopt to
deal with conflicts between SOX provisions and foreign laws, and lists
some justifications that could be made for each. Section A discusses the
option of strictly enforcing SOX at home and abroad, even in the face of
noncompliance due to a conflict with foreign law. Section B discusses the
various options involving the refusal to strictly enforce SOX against foreign
companies. Section C lays out the argument that the SEC and U.S. courts
do not have authority either to enforce or to exempt foreign companies
because SOX has no extraterritorial effect at all.
A. Strict Enforcement: Denying Exemptive Relief to Foreign Companies
The first approach the SEC (and U.S. courts) could adopt is to strictly
enforce the provisions of SOX extraterritorially, even when such provisions
are inconsistent with, or duplicative of, foreign laws. Subsection 1 analyzes
the application of this approach to the various circumstances in which the
extraterritorial application of SOX would conflict 273 with foreign law, while
subsection 2 provides some justifications for adopting this approach.
1. Strict Enforcement Option in Action
Under this approach, the provisions of SOX would be applied equally to
all foreign companies subject to SOX regardless of whether such
application conflicts with foreign laws, and regardless of the type of
conflict that results. That is, exemptive relief would be denied to a foreign
company regardless of whether the basis for the requested relief is that (1)
the contemplated conduct is legal in the country where it is to occur; (2) the
company already complies with foreign laws equivalent to SOX, making
compliance with SOX overly burdensome because it would subject the
company to costly double regulation; or (3) compliance with SOX would
force the company to violate a foreign law which would subject it to civil or
criminal penalties abroad-i.e., a "true conflict" 274 exists between SOX and
this foreign law.
271. See supra note 241 for the broad meaning given to the term "conflict" as used in this
sentence.
272. To some degree U.S. federal courts could also use these approaches.
273. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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2. Justifications for Strict Enforcement
This subsection lists various justifications for enforcing the penalties
mandated by SOX against foreign companies that fail to strictly comply
with the provisions of SOX. Subsection A.2.a discusses the advantage of
having a single set of laws that are applied uniformly to all companies
regardless of their places of origin.2 75 Subsection A.2.b provides a policy
argument for punishing such companies for noncompliance.
a. Level Playing Field Justification
On June 11, 2003, SEC Commissioner Roel C. Campos spoke at the
Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, Belgium.276 In this speech,
he provided a number of reasons why providing SOX exemptions to foreign
companies may not be the best policy. For example, like any national
regulator, the SEC has the right to set terms and conditions that must be met
before financial service providers may access investors in its jurisdiction.277
Implementing different terms and conditions depending on the market
participant's origin ("mutual recognition") "lead[s] to an incoherent,
fragmented market." 278 Because this is not in the best interest of investors
or the market, the SEC prefers to establish a single set of rules for
participants in the U.S. market. 279 The philosophy is that all participants
should be on a "level playing field," and that no issuer, intermediary,
exchange, or other participant should be discriminated against based on its
country of origin.2 80
275. This argument may be termed the "level playing field justification." Under this
view, U.S. law should not differentiate between companies based on place of origin because
it is more efficient and fair to have one set of rules that apply uniformly to all companies
than two sets of differing rules applied non-uniformly.
276. His remarks were entitled, "Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron
Era," and were designed to outline the SEC's regulatory philosophy as it relates to cross-
border business. Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, SEC, Embracing International Business in the
Post-Enron Era, Speech at Centre for European Policy Studies (June 11, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch06l03rcc.htm. The views expressed in this speech
were his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the SEC. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. For the past seventy years, the SEC has provided equal treatment to all market
participants with "[flew distinctions ... based on the domicile of the issuer or service
provider. After all, [American] investors are entitled to the same protections regardless of
whether an issuer is foreign or domestic." Id.
280. Id. "The level playing field is necessary for three reasons: [1] equal protection of
U.S. investors regardless of the issuer's origin; [2] avoiding unfair competition by foreign
issuers to the detriment of their U.S. competitors; and [3] discrimination against foreign
issuers would deprive U.S. investors of foreign investment opportunities." Paul B. Ford,
Sarbanes-Oxlev--An International Markets Perspective, in 2 35th Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation, Corporate Law and Practice Handbook Series 353, 361 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B- 1396, 2003).
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Providing an exemption to companies who violate SOX due to a
conflict281 with foreign law is inconsistent with the "level playing field"
principle. Such an exemption would give these companies access to
American investors on terms different from those available to other
companies listed on U.S. exchanges. "This, in turn, puts considerable stress
on our system of regulation, disrupting the level playing field we have
created for all market participants. '282
b. Prevention of an Environment Conducive to Fraud
It is without question that "[t]he United States has a substantial interest in
the enforcement of its securities laws and the protection of investors in the
United States securities markets." 283 This interest would be thwarted if the
SEC were to grant exemptions to foreign companies in situations where
compliance with SOX would conflict 284 with the laws of their home
countries. For example, such exemptions would enable multinational
corporations to move all of their fraudulent operations to jurisdictions with
laws in place that would exempt them from SOX compliance. 285
Alternatively, such exemptions may encourage foreign countries to enact
laws contrary to SOX for the purpose of providing their companies with a
competitive advantage. 286 In light of these policy considerations, and the
importance of the U.S. securities laws,2 87 one can argue that exemptions to
SOX should not be granted even when noncompliance is due to a "true
conflict" with foreign law.28 8
281. See supra note 241.
282. Campos, supra note 276.
283. Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
284. Supra note 241.
285. Cf Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 847 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003) ("Were a defense based on lack of control over requested information [due to
foreign statutes enacted to shield foreign corporations from routine reporting requirements] a
requirement of substantive due process, an insurer could evade any kind of state disclosure
statute or regulation simply by transferring all relevant documents to an affiliate over which
it lacks direct control."). Gerling involved a California statute (Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act, or HVIRA) that required any insurer doing business in the state that sold
insurance policies to Europeans between 1920 and 1945 (i.e., Holocaust-era policies) to file
certain information about the policies with the Commissioner. Id. at 836. This regulation
applied to insurance companies that were "related" to companies that sold such Holocaust-
era policies, regardless of whether the relationship arose before or after the policies were
issued. Id. Any insurer that failed to comply with the reporting requirements was subject to
the suspension of its certificate of authority to conduct business in the state of California. Id.
286. For example, a number of countries have done this in the past by passing blocking
statutes to combat the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws. See supra notes 265-66 and
accompanying text.
287. See Cromer, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 479; SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding the enforcement of the securities laws to be a "vital
national interest").
288. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. That is, even if a true conflict exists and
a comity analysis is conducted, the U.S. interest in enforcing SOX in such a situation could
be deemed to trump any interest the foreign sovereign has in enforcing its own laws-in
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B. Not Strictly Enforcing SOX
Rather than strictly enforcing SOX across the board, the SEC (and to a
limited extent, courts 289) could decide to adopt an approach that would call
for granting relief to foreign companies under certain circumstances. This
section discusses the various approaches to exemptive relief that could be
adopted by the SEC and, in certain circumstances, by courts.
1. Exempt All Foreign Companies Subject to Adequate Regulatory
Regimes
The SEC could decide to exempt from the regulatory requirements of
SOX all foreign companies who are already subject to adequate securities
and corporate governance regulations.290 Under this approach, if foreign
countries subject companies in their territories to corporate governance
regulations deemed adequate by the SEC, then these companies would be
exempt from the requirements of SOX. Consequently, the fact that such a
company could not, or would not, comply with SOX because of its home
country's labor laws,2 9' data protection laws, 292 or corporate laws and/or
structure29 3 would no longer be an issue. On the other hand, should the
SEC determine that compliance with a foreign country's securities and
corporate governance regime would inadequately protect U.S. investors,
then it will strictly enforce the requirements of SOX as to these companies.
The rationale for adopting this approach stems from the fact that such
companies are already complying with laws that have the same effect as
SOX's requirements. 294 Thus, forcing such companies to comply with
SOX would overburden them with duplicative requirements, whereas U.S
which case SOX would be enforced despite the existence of the true conflict. See, e.g., In re
Aircrash Near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. 295, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
289. Courts are more limited in their discretion to provide relief to foreign companies
because courts, unlike the SEC, do not have the authority to grant exemptions to the
securities laws.
290. This is the approach being pushed for by the European Commission. See Comment
Letter from EC, supra note 121; see also Falencki, supra note 87, at 1236 ("If the home
country of a foreign corporation has an adequate regulatory structure for corporate
governance, the SEC should exempt that company from the requirements of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.").
291. See supra Part I.D.2.a & Part I.D.3.b.
292. See supra Part I.D. 1 & Part I.D.2.b.
293. See supra note 146 and Part I.D.3.a.
294. Comment Letter from EC, supra note 121 (arguing that "EU companies and auditors
are already subject to ... Member State corporate governance requirements [that] ... are in
their different ways as effective and efficient at providing investor protection as U.S. rules");
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament: Reinforcing the statutory audit in the EU, at 15-17,
COM (2003) 286 final (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Communication from the Commission]
(referring to discussions between the Commission of the European Communities and the
United States embarked upon for the purpose of "achiev[ing] recognition that EU regulatory
approaches to the protection of investors and other stakeholders are equivalent to US rules").
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companies would only be subject to one set of regulations. 295 Such a result
could negatively impact the United States in at least two major ways. First,
foreign countries could decide to give extraterritorial effect to their
securities and corporate governance laws and not exempt U.S. companies
based on the equivalence of U.S. laws in these areas.296 At least with
regard to the European Union, this would mean that in addition to
complying with SOX, U.S. companies would have to comply with an
additional twenty-five sets of securities and corporate governance
regulatory regimes.297 This would be extremely costly and burdensome on
U.S. companies with foreign subsidiaries or which have a dual listing on a
foreign exchange. Second, forcing foreign companies to comply with SOX,
without exception, may deter foreign companies from entering and/or
remaining in U.S. capital markets.2 98 This is detrimental to U.S. investors
because the presence of foreign securities in U.S. markets promotes
portfolio diversification by increasing investment options.299
2. Always Refuse to Enforce SOX when Compliance Violates Foreign Law
A second approach to providing exemptive relief involves refusing to
enforce provisions of SOX on foreign companies whenever compliance
with foreign law prevents compliance with SOX. Under this approach,
relief would be denied to a U.K. company300 requesting relief either on the
ground that the contemplated conduct is legal where it is to occur or on the
ground that compliance would result in costly double regulation. On the
other hand, a request for exemptive relief would be granted to a foreign
company doing business in France that fails to implement the required
anonymous whistleblower hotline because doing so would cause it to
violate French data protection or labor laws.30 1
The adoption of this approach would be consistent with the doctrine of
sovereign compulsion. The doctrine of sovereign compulsion states that a
person is not subject to punishment for acts committed within a foreign
territory that were ordered or compelled by the sovereign of that
295. Comment Letter from EC, supra note 121.
296. Communication from the Commission, supra note 294, art 16 (stating that if the
SEC refuses to exempt E.U. audit firms from the requirement that they register with the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, then "the EU will have to consider parallel
solutions e.g. requiring the registration of US audit firms in the EU").
297. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part I.C.2.
299. See Release No. 33-8220, supra note 223, at 18,802 (noting that the SEC "ha[s] long
recognized the importance of the globalization of the securities markets ... for investors
who desire increased diversification"); Campos, supra note 276 (stating that "investors
benefit from [the SEC] taking care not to regulate business out of existence" and that, in
fulfilling its duty, the SEC "must also work towards ensuring that a positive investment
environment flourishes").
300. See supra note 146.
301. See supra Part I.D.2.
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territory. 30 2 This doctrine is an extension of the "act of state" doctrine,
which states that "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory." 30 3 This defense does not apply to the acts of a
foreign sovereign that are not exclusively within its own territory.
The SEC could determine, for example, that the doctrine of foreign
compulsion requires it to refrain from delisting a company, such as
McDonald's or Exide, 304 for violating the anonymous whistleblower hotline
provision when compliance would have forced the company to violate a
foreign country's data protection laws. This assumes, of course, that the
office that has violated the SOX whistleblowing hotline provision is located
in the territory of the sovereign that is declaring such hotline to be illegal
(e.g., France). The act of state doctrine, and thus the doctrine of foreign
compulsion, only recognizes a foreign country's sovereignty over conduct
within its territory. Therefore, conduct occurring outside of that
sovereign's jurisdiction cannot trigger the exemptive relief provided for by
these doctrines.
3. Situation-Specific Granting of Relief
Alternatively, relief from the provisions of SOX may be provided to a
company or group of companies on a case-by-case basis in light of the
exigencies of the circumstances. Under this approach, courts or the SEC
will refuse to enforce the provisions of SOX against foreign companies only
if, after analyzing and weighing a number of relevant factors and competing
interests, it is determined that such relief is necessary. The extent of this
analysis, and of the factors to be considered, will differ depending on
whether relief is requested of the SEC or of a court. Subsection B.3.a
discusses how the SEC may handle requests for relief, whereas subsection
B.3.b addresses how U.S. courts could deal with such requests.
a. SEC: Balancing Approach
Although the SEC does not practice mutual recognition,305 it has
traditionally accommodated foreign companies-coming from countries
with different customs and regulatory systems-where doing so did not
sacrifice investor protections. 30 6 The SEC can take a similar approach
302. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976);
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del.
1970) ("When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey.
Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign.").
303. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
304. See supra Part I.D.2.b.ii.
305. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
306. Campos, supra note 276 ("[The SEC has] recognized that, in some cases,
accommodations for foreign participants must be made where it is possible to make them
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when dealing with requests for relief from the provisions of SOX. In
general, the SEC may provide exemptive relief from the provisions of the
Exchange Act-which now includes many SOX provisions-to the extent
that such relief is permitted by the public interest and is consistent with
investor protection.30 7 Thus, where doing so would be consistent with the
public interest, the SEC could decide to provide relief to a specific company
or group of companies from a particular SOX provision.308 This situation-
specific approach to granting relief would call upon the SEC to provide
accommodations to foreign companies when doing so would be in the best
interest of U.S. investors and when failing to do so would be detrimental to
U.S. investors. 309
b. Courts: Comity Analysis
Although U.S. courts cannot grant exemptions from U.S. laws on public
policy grounds because this would improperly delve into the domain of the
legislature, they can provide relief to foreign companies through reliance on
notions of international comity. However, before such relief can be
granted, a suit must be brought in a U.S. court against a foreign company
for the violation of a SOX provision. Relief, in such situations, will take
the form of a court's refusal to enforce the provisions of SOX as to a
particular foreign company. However, the circumstances in which relief
will be provided, and the grounds on which the court bases its decision, will
depend on what that court views as the proper role of a comity analysis.
Subsections B.3.b.i, B.3.b.ii, and B.3.b.iii discuss the various approaches
that courts could adopt as to the proper role of comity analysis.
i. Mannington Mills Approach to Comity
According to this approach, courts look to notions of international comity
to determine whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 31 0  After
determining that the U.S. law at issue in the case has extraterritorial reach,
for example, as a result of either the conduct or effects test, 311 these courts
will then balance a number of relevant factors (i.e., conduct a comity
analysis) 312 in order to determine whether they should exercise or decline
their jurisdiction under the given circumstances.
without sacrificing investor protection. Thus, in a number of contexts, we have made
adjustments to our rules resulting in more favorable treatment to foreign market
participants."); see supra Part I.A.5 and note 87.
307. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
308. See Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880, 890 (D.P.R. 1966) ("[I]t is the responsibility
of the [SEC] ... to determine the extent, if any, to which the public interest will permit
accommodation between... the Exchange Act and.., foreign law.").
309. Part III of this Note will discuss some of the factors that the SEC should take into
account in determining whether to grant relief in a particular situation.
310. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
312. See supra notes 250, 254.
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When foreign companies request relief from the provisions of SOX,
courts subscribing to this approach will conduct a comity analysis
regardless of the type of conflict involved; 3 13 though the type of conflict
involved may play a role in the balancing process. Thus, in determining
whether to exercise jurisdiction over a German company that requests SOX
relief due to incompatibility with their labor and corporate laws, over a
French company that requests SOX relief due to incompatibility with their
labor and data protection laws, or over a U.K. company that requests SOX
relief due to costly duplicative regulatory regimes, these courts will
consider notions of international comity.
ii. Hartford Fire Insurance: The Majority's Approach to Comity
For courts subscribing to the majority view in Hartford Fire Insurance,
comity analysis serves the same function as it does for courts adopting the
Mannington Mills approach-that is, such an analysis is conducted for the
purpose of determining whether to exercise or decline the court's
jurisdiction. However, courts adopting this approach will only conduct a
comity analysis in situations involving a "true conflict"-that is, in
situations where it is impossible for a foreign company to comply with both
foreign and domestic law. 314
Consequently, under this approach, a court would not conduct a comity
analysis in a situation where a company had violated SOX by engaging in
conduct abroad that was legal in that jurisdiction, even if that company was
already subject to foreign laws that are arguably the equivalent of SOX.
Nor would such an analysis occur in a situation where a German company
failed to implement the required whistleblower hotline, 3 15 because nothing
inherent in German labor law makes compliance with SOX's whistleblower
hotline requirement impossible. 3 16 Rather, with regard to German labor
law, the only barrier to the implementation of these hotlines is procedural;
namely, works council consent must first be obtained.3 17 On the other
hand, if the French CNIL determines that a particular company's
whistleblower hotline is illegal-for example, because the proportionality
of the contemplated whistleblowing is not legitimate, or because the CNIL
determines that all anonymous reporting is illegal 3 18 -then a U.S. court
313. See supra note 241.
314. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
315. Such failure could occur either because the works council refused to agree to
implementation of the hotline, or because a German court ruled that its current operation is
illegal because the company implemented it without first seeking approval of the works
council.
316. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
317. Although German issuers could still argue that the SOX whistleblower hotline
requirement is overly burdensome because it gives the works council leverage over the
employer in negotiations over its implementation, this burden would not be considered a true
conflict under Hartford Fire Insurance's majority opinion.
318. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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subscribing to the Hartford Fire Insurance's majority approach would
conduct a comity analysis in that case.319
iii. Hartford Fire Insurance: The Minority's Approach to Comity
The minority opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance emphasized a canon of
statutory construction, completely independent of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, 320 stating that acts of Congress should "'never... be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains."' 321  This canon of construction "is relevant to determining the
substantive reach of a statute because 'the law of nations,' or customary
international law, includes limitations on a nation's exercise of its
jurisdiction to prescribe." 322  Although Congress has constitutional
authority to exceed these "customary international-law limits on jurisdiction
to prescribe," it is generally presumed not to have done so. 323
Consequently, courts have frequently held "that, even where the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply, statutes should not be
interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that regulation would
conflict with principles of international law." 324
To determine whether the regulation of particular foreign persons or
conduct conflicts with principles of international law, courts subscribing to
Hartford Fire Insurance's minority approach will look to notions of
international comity (and conduct a comity analysis). 325 The purpose of
319. It should be noted that the discussion here about the options available to a court
adopting the Hartford Fire Insurance's majority approach in a case where a foreign
company violates Section 301's whistleblower hotline requirement is purely hypothetical,
and is being discussed merely to illustrate a situation involving a "true conflict" between
SOX and foreign law. A court would probably not be involved in a proceeding for the
violation of Section 301 because the de-listing penalty is carried out by the SEC-and
therefore there is not much that courts can do. However, this discussion of the options
available to a court in situations where a foreign company violates Section 301 would not be
purely hypothetical to a court that has adopted Hartford Fire Insurance's minority approach.
See infra Part II.B.3.b.iii (noting that under the minority approach a court could decide that a
particular SOX provision has no extraterritorial effect because prescriptive jurisdiction is
lacking).
320. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
321. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 817-20. Courts subscribing to Hartford Fire Insurance's minority
approach view notions of "comity" not as
comity of courts, whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters
more appropriately adjudged elsewhere, but rather [as] what might be termed
"prescriptive comity": the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting
the reach of their laws. That comity is exercised by legislatures when they enact
laws, and courts assume it has been exercised when they come to interpreting the
scope of laws their legislatures have enacted. It is a traditional component of
choice-of-law theory. Comity in this sense includes the choice-of-law principles
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this analysis is to determine whether the U.S. law serving as the basis for
the action actually prohibits the conduct at issue-as opposed to whether a
court should exercise jurisdiction over a matter involving conduct already
deemed to be prohibited by U.S. law. 326 Finally, this approach does not
view the presence of a "true conflict" as a prerequisite to conducting a
comity analysis. 327
The next section discusses the option of refusing to give extraterritorial
effect to various provisions of SOX on the basis of the presumption against
extraterritoriality-without conducting a situation-specific comity analysis.
C. Absent Clear Expression, SOXIs Not to be Given Extraterritorial Effect
Courts or the SEC could decide that the vast majority of SOX provisions
are not applicable abroad. The fact that most provisions of SOX lack
explicit language declaring their extraterritorial reach could be construed to
imply that no such reach was intended. Under this approach, U.S.
companies with foreign subsidiaries or foreign offices and non-U.S.
companies listed on U.S. exchanges or which have U.S. subsidiaries would
not have to worry about incurring penalties based on conduct occurring at
their non-U.S. offices. Consequently, a company such as McDonald's
would not be delisted if its foreign subsidiary neglected to establish a
procedure for the anonymous reporting of questionable accounting methods
because doing so would violate the laws of the country where it is
situated,32 8 so long as the American branches were in compliance with this
requirement. In addition, German issuers would not be burdened with
costly restructuring of their corporations, 329 while U.K. issuers would not
be subject to duplicative regulatory schemes. 330
The adoption of this approach would be consistent with the presumption
against extraterritoriality, a well-known "canon of construction which
teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States." 331 It may therefore be argued that, far from signaling Congress's
that, "in the absence of contrary congressional direction," are assumed to be
incorporated into our substantive laws having extraterritorial reach.
Id. at 817 (citations omitted).
326. See id. at 817-18, 818 n.9.
327. Id. at 820-21 (noting that the fact that the petitioners "were not compelled by any
foreign law to take their allegedly wrongful actions [does not] preclude[] a conflict-of-laws
analysis here").
328. See supra Part I.D.2.b.ii.
329. See supra Part I.D.3.a.
330. See supra note 146.
331. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Carnero v. Boston Scientific
Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Where, as here, a statute is silent as to its territorial
reach, and no contrary congressional intent clearly appears, there is generally a presumption
against its extraterritorial application."). In addition to "reflect[ing] the notion that when
Congress legislates, it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions," this presumption
also serves the purpose of "protect[ing] against unintended clashes between our laws and
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intent for SOX provisions to be applied abroad-as is maintained by the
SEC, at least with regard to Section 10A(m) of the Exchange Act332-the
lack of differentiation between foreign and domestic issuers actually
suggests that this provision of SOX is not applicable abroad.333 In fact, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, relying upon the
presumption against extraterritoriality, has already held that one of SOX's
whistleblower protection provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A,334 does not have
extraterritorial reach. 335
Part III advocates for the adoption of the approach outlined above in Part
II.B.3, excluding Part II.B.3.b.ii, whereby the SEC will provide relief to
foreign companies from the provisions of SOX after weighing a number of
relevant factors. 336
III. SOX ON THE RIGHT TRACK: THE PROPER APPROACH TO HANDLING
FOREIGN REQUESTS FOR SOX RELIEF
A. Allowing for Situation-Specific Detours from SOX through the No-
Action Process
The SEC should handle requests seeking relief from the provisions of
SOX through the no-action process,337 or some analogous process. 338
those of other nations which could result in international discord." Carnero, 433 F.3d at 7
(internal quotation marks omitted).
332. See Release No. 33-8220, supra note 223, at 18,802 (stating that in light of "Section
10A(m) of the Exchange Act mak[ing] no distinction between domestic and foreign
issuers. . . [and the fact that] the importance of maintaining effective oversight over the
financial reporting process is relevant for listed securities of any issuer, regardless of its
domicile ... the [SEC's] direction to the SROs will apply to listings by foreign private
issuers as well as domestic issuers").
333. This argument is supported by recent court decisions such as the one in Carnero v.
Boston Scientific Corp., which held that SOX does not apply to employees working outside
of the United States. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. Civ.A.04-10031, 2004 WL
1922132 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2004), affd, 433 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2006). In support of its
conclusion that nothing in § 1514(A)-which prohibits retaliation against an "employee" for
whistleblowing-suggests that Congress meant for it to apply abroad, the court made note of
the fact that no distinction was drawn between overseas and domestic employees. Id. at *2.
334. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
335. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 6-7. This case involved an action under section 806 of SOX, in
which a former employee at two foreign subsidiaries of Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC)
alleged that he had been terminated in retaliation for "'whistleblowing'-for telling BSC that
Latin American subsidiaries had created false invoices and had inflated sales figures." Id. at
2.
336. Part III will focus primarily on the SEC and the justifications in favor of adopting a
situation-specific approach to granting relief. However, many of these same justifications
would also support one or another of the approaches that courts could adopt to handle such
situations of conflict. Those approaches are described supra Part II.B.3.b.
337. See supra Part I.A.2. Through the no-action process, the SEC staff provides
requesting parties with its enforcement position regarding specific factual scenarios or its
interpretation of statutes and rules in the context of a particular course of conduct. Gallagher,
supra note 26, at 1027.
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Under this approach, the SEC will provide relief to foreign companies by
issuing favorable no-action letters and/or interpretive letters. 339 In addition
to being the most pragmatic approach available, all of the benefits
associated with the no-action process would carry over.340
Under this approach, foreign companies may request relief from a SOX
provision in one of two ways. First, they may request that, in light of the
specific circumstances they currently face, the SEC should not initiate an
enforcement action against them. Second, they may request that the SEC
should, if possible, interpret a particular SOX provision in such a way that
their proposed course of conduct would not be in violation of its terms. The
relief granted from the former type of request-i.e., the issuance of a
favorable no-action letter-would be available only to the particular
requestor. 341 Therefore, others in similar situations would have to write
their own letters requesting relief. However, relief granted from the latter
type of request-i.e., the issuance of a favorable interpretive letter-would
be available to all those similarly situated. 342
In determining whether to grant the requested relief, the SEC staff should
rely not only on notions of public policy, but should also draw upon notions
of international comity.343 Thus, when a request is authored by a foreign
company and involves conduct that will take place in a foreign jurisdiction,
the SEC should conduct a comity analysis 344 similar to the interest
balancing tests adopted by courts in cases involving the extraterritorial
338. For example, in situations where U.S. securities laws conflict with foreign laws, the
SEC may decide to delegate its exemptive authority to its staff (or perhaps to an SEC
division created for the purpose of dealing with such problems). Consequently, a favorable
no-action or interpretive letter issued by the staff (or designated SEC division) would be
deemed the action of the Commission if the SEC refused to exercise its right of review. See
supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
339. See supra Part L.A and notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Whereas no-action
letters analyze specific courses of conduct (and whether such conduct will lead to an SEC
enforcement action), interpretive letters analyze specific statutes, rules, or regulations as they
apply to particular fact patterns. Gallagher, supra note 26, at 1027 n. 103.
340. For example, among other advantages, the process allows the staff to take positions
on the basis of public interest and protection of investors (as opposed to adopting positions
solely on the basis of laws that are often unclear); it also allows a given position to be taken
even though there is no agreement by the staff or the Commission for the basis of the
decision; and it enables the staff to permit apparently lawful, but completely novel, types of
proposals to go forward despite the fact that the staff is currently unable to take a position on
the proposal. Lemke, supra note 31, at 1021 n.10.
341. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
343. On numerous occasions, the SEC has issued favorable no-action letters in response
to companies' requests for relief on international comity grounds. E.g., Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 461290, at *7-8 (Apr. 19, 2001);
Pharmacia Aktiebolag, The Upiohn Company, Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1995 WL 570452, at *3 (Sept. 15, 1995); Procordia Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget
Volvo, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286327, at *13-14 (Mar. 30, 1990).
344. The existence of a "true conflict" should not be a prerequisite to conducting this
analysis. Rather, the presence of a "true conflict" should be one of the factors that a court
takes into account in its comity analysis-albeit a very important factor that is to be given
great weight in the balancing process.
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reach of U.S. antitrust and discovery laws.345 In addition to the factors
considered by those courts,346 the SEC should also consider (1) the purpose
behind a conflicting foreign law and the timing of its enactment;347 (2) the
company's relationship to the United States and to the foreign
jurisdiction348-i.e., whether there is evidence of forum shopping; (3) the
true purpose of the foreign company's request for relief, if evidence of this
intent exists;349 (4) whether providing a foreign company with relief from
SOX will have a significant or negligible impact (either positive or
negative) on U.S. investors; and (5) whether the foreign company is subject
to corporate governance and securities regulations equivalent to those of the
United States. Although the SEC does not recognize the policy of mutual
recognition, 350 a foreign company's compliance with regulations reasonably
equivalent to those of SOX is nevertheless relevant to the SEC's balancing
of the competing sovereign interests involved in the dispute. For example,
although the United States has a substantial interest in the enforcement of
its securities laws, 351 this interest is tempered when the foreign company is
subject to regulations equivalent to those of SOX that are consistently
enforced by the foreign jurisdiction. In such a situation, the vital national
interests of the foreign jurisdiction may trump the now diminished U.S.
interest, thus supporting a decision to provide relief to the foreign company
on international comity grounds.
The adoption of this approach is preferable to that of the other
approaches discussed in Part II. It is preferable to the strict-enforcement
approach for a number of reasons. First, the provision of some form of
exemptive relief is necessary not only on international comity grounds, but
also because providing such relief is in the best interest of U.S. investors
and securities markets. Many foreign companies have already chosen to
forgo listing on U.S. exchanges, and many others are contemplating
delisting their current U.S. securities due to the burdensome costs
345. See supra notes 250, 254, 269-70 and accompanying text.
346. Id.
347. For example, if a foreign jurisdiction enacts a law that conflicts with SOX for the
sole purpose of protecting its corporations from SOX's reach, then the SEC should find that
the U.S. interest in enforcing its securities laws trumps the foreign jurisdiction's interest in
its conflicting law. Cf In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. 295, 310 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (considering the fact that the "French [blocking] law was originally created [for the
purpose of] block[ing] United States antitrust laws" as a relevant factor favoring the
application of U.S. law despite the potential conflict with foreign law).
348. For example, the SEC should not grant relief to a company that relocated from the
United States to a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding SOX (either because that
jurisdiction has laws equivalent to, but somewhat more lenient than, those of the United
States, or because relocating to that jurisdiction causes a situation of conflict, and the notions
of international comity counsel against the assertion of U.S. law).
349. For example, if the SEC discovers documents or internal memoranda evidencing an
intent to relocate the company's fraudulent practices to a foreign subsidiary (located in a
jurisdiction with laws more lenient than SOX) subsequent to an SEC grant of relief, then the
SEC obviously should not grant such relief.
350. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 283, 287 and accompanying text.
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associated with SOX compliance. 35 2 Denying exemptive relief even in
situations involving legitimate conflicts with foreign law will only make
matters worse. A mass exodus of foreign issuers from the U.S. securities
market will be detrimental to U.S. investors because of the declining
diversity of available securities. 353 This decline will only increase as a
greater number of companies choose to stay away from the U.S. market,
while others are simultaneously forced from the market through SOX
enforcement.
Second, denying any form of exemptive relief would alienate not only
foreign companies, but foreign governing agencies as well (because their
sovereign authority is being devalued). Should the SEC choose to apply
SOX to conduct occurring abroad without providing any form of exemptive
relief, then foreign countries may retaliate against U.S. companies through
similar measures.354 Thus, in addition to complying with SOX, American
multinational corporations would also have to comply with numerous other
regulatory regimes whose laws may vary to a significant degree. This
would vastly increase the cost of conducting business abroad, which will
likely have an adverse effect on U.S. investors.
Third, an approach denying any exemptive relief is, in actuality,
inconsistent with the notion of a "level playing field"355 because companies
operating solely in the United States are advantaged since they are not
subject to conflicting foreign law. Under the no-action system, however, all
companies are treated similarly, in that they all may request relief through
the no-action process when faced with foreign penalties. Furthermore, the
adoption of the no-action approach would not promote an environment
conducive to fraud356 because exemptive relief is not guaranteed. If it
appears that a company moved to a jurisdiction with conflicting laws for the
sole purpose of evading compliance with SOX, then the SEC will issue a
no-action letter denying exemptive relief.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the adoption of some system of
foreign exemptive relief ultimately benefits U.S. investors in the long run
by creating an atmosphere of regulatory cooperation, as opposed to
regulatory alienation. The SEC reserves the right to alienate foreign
companies, governments, and regulatory agencies, but it must pick and
choose its battles carefully. The global market in securities is rapidly
growing, cross-border transactions are commonplace, and violations of the
securities laws are increasingly occurring abroad. For the SEC to
successfully enforce the U.S. securities laws in this increasingly global
352. See supra Part I.C.
353. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
354. Some officials have already threatened that unless foreign companies are entirely
exempt from SOX, then each member state of the European Union may in turn force
companies located in the United States to comply with their individual laws. See supra notes
125, 296-97 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
356. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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marketplace, it must continue to receive cooperation from foreign
regulatory agencies. 357 Currently, the SEC receives foreign assistance in
enforcing the U.S. securities laws through the use of letters rogatory, 358 the
Hague Convention, 359 MLATs,360 and MOUs. 36 1 Although extremely
useful, each of these methods of obtaining foreign assistance has its own
flaws, and all of them generally allow foreign agencies, courts, or central
authorities to refuse to provide the requested relief under certain
circumstances. 362 Consequently, if these agencies are needlessly alienated
by the SEC's strict enforcement of SOX-without providing relief under
any circumstances-in complete disregard of that country's sovereign
interests, then they may not cooperate in enforcing U.S. securities laws
within their territories. Such a course of conduct would be to the detriment,
rather than benefit, of U.S. investors. For all of these reasons, the SEC
should, pursuant to its authority to grant exemptions "to the extent that such
exemption[s] [are] necessary or appropriate in the public interest,"363 adopt
some form of exemptive system for situations involving conflict with
foreign law.
Although an approach involving exemptive relief is necessary, providing
foreign companies with too much exemptive relief is not the best course of
action. Exempting all issuers subject to relatively equivalent foreign law 364
encourages forum shopping for the least restrictive equivalent alternative.
Companies engaged in fraudulent conduct will then move those operations
to a subsidiary in the least restrictive equivalent jurisdiction. Moreover, this
approach to exemptive relief would not account for situations in which a
foreign sovereign's law conflicts with SOX, but where that sovereign lacks
an adequately equivalent corporate governance regulatory regime. Under
the equivalence approach, no exemption would be granted regardless of
how strong the foreign jurisdiction's vital national interest is as compared to
the corresponding U.S. interest in a particular SOX provision (which may
be minimal in that particular instance). For this reason, the no-action
process approach is more useful for handling such situations because it
incorporates a comity analysis into the decision to grant relief.
An approach that would provide foreign companies with exemptive relief
from SOX whenever they are subject to conflicting foreign law 36 5 would
also not be in the best interest of investors. First, this might encourage U.S.
companies either to relocate to, or open foreign subsidiaries in, countries
having laws that directly conflict with SOX's mandates. As a result, these
companies would move all their illegal and fraudulent activities to such
357. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 54, 59-61, 69-72, 76 and accompanying text.
363. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2000).
364. See supra Part II.B. 1.
365. See supra Part II.B.2.
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jurisdictions to avoid being penalized under SOX-because this approach
would exempt them from SOX's provisions. This not only creates an
environment conducive to fraud, but it also provides an incentive for
foreign governments to pass laws that directly conflict with SOX in order to
attract business to their jurisdictions. Moreover, although such an approach
to exemptive relief finds support in the doctrine of sovereign
compulsion, 366 this doctrine is frequently not followed. 367 Furthermore,
while policy considerations may often favor granting exemptions, at other
times the importance of applying U.S. law in a particular situation may be
so great that it eclipses any negative impact that may result. The no-action
approach takes all of these considerations into account.
Finally, denying extraterritorial effect to SOX provisions that lack
explicit language concerning their reach 368 is also inappropriate. The fact
that many SOX provisions are silent regarding their extraterritorial reach
does not necessarily mean that, under all circumstances, the presumption
against extraterritoriality absolutely bars their application abroad.369 For
example, where precedent exists as to an Act's extraterritorial reach, the
presumption against extraterritoriality may be overcome. 370 Courts have
held that, under certain circumstances, the U.S. securities laws can have
extraterritorial reach.371  Consequently, as with the antitrust laws, the
366. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
367. For example, in the context of international discovery, companies are often ordered
to comply with U.S. discovery requests despite the fact that compliance with such requests
violates foreign secrecy or blocking statutes. E.g., Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880, 891
(D.P.R. 1966) ("Should it ultimately be found that it is necessary in the public interest that
the disclosures required under the Securities Exchange Act... be required of [Investors
Overseas Services (IOS)] even if such disclosure could be had only through violation of
Swiss law.., then lOS must decide whether or not it wishes to continue to do business in
the United States. If IOS wishes to do so through the use of the mails and facilities of
interstate commerce, it must be willing to comply fully with United States law. If not, it is
up to IOS to determine where it wants to do business." (footnote omitted)).
368. See supra Part II.C.
369. See, e.g., Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[I]n
appropriate circumstances Congress's extraterritorial intent [may be] implied without
explicit statement in the text or even history.").
370. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) ("[I]f the question were
not governed by precedent, it would be worth considering whether th[e] presumption
[against extraterritoriality] controls the outcome here. We have, however, found th[at]
presumption to be overcome with respect to our antitrust laws; it is now well established that
the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.").
371. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 529-30 (1974) ("It has been recognized
that the 1934 Act ... applies when foreign defendants have defrauded American investors,
particularly when . . . they have profited by virtue of proscribed conduct within our
boundaries. This is true even when the defendant is organized under the laws of a foreign
country, is conducting much of its activity outside the United States, and is therefore
governed largely by foreign law." (footnote omitted)); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Conduct within the territory alone would
seem sufficient from the standpoint of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule .... [W]hen ... there
has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot properly be held
inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the clearest language, Congress will not be
assumed to have meant to go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law.");
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presumption against the extraterritorial application of the securities laws has
been overcome-at least when the requirements of the conduct or effects
tests have been satisfied. The provisions of SOX merely amend the
securities laws and should therefore be given the same extraterritorial
treatment. Thus, the presumption against the extraterritorial application of
SOX is overcome to the same extent as the other securities laws. 372
B. Application of the Situation-Specific Approach to SOX Relief
Applying the approach proposed above in Part III.A, this section
discusses how the SEC should have reacted in the immediate aftermath of
the two CNIL decisions that declared anonymous whistleblower hotlines to
be in violation of France's data protection laws.
First, the SEC should have recognized that the two CNIL decisions
represented "true conflict" situations. As such, the SEC should have
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Congress intended the
Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who
have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic
securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities
.... [T~he usual presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation ... [does not]
show Congressional intent to preclude application of the Exchange Act . . . when
extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors."); see Itoba
Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121-24 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying both the conduct and
effects tests in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction); see also Restatement Third of
Foreign Relations Law § 416(1)(c)-(d) (1987) ("The United States may generally exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to [1] conduct, regardless of where it occurs,
significantly related to a transaction [in securities carried out, or intended to be carried out,
either predominantly in the United States or on an organized U.S. securities market], if the
conduct has, or is intended to have, a substantial effect in the United States; [and] [2]
conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related to a transaction in
securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the United States.").
372. This conclusion is consistent with Carnero, which held that section 806 of SOX does
not have extraterritorial effect. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 6-7. There, the court stated that "while
the Sarbanes-Oxley purpose to protect investors and build confidence in U.S. securities
markets may be a factor supporting extraterritorial application of the instant whistleblower
protection provision . . . contrary indicia prevent our determining that Congress has
evidenced its 'clear intent' for extraterritorial application." Id. at 8. For example, in contrast
to Congress's silence regarding the extraterritorial application of Section 806, Congress
expressly provided for the extraterritorial enforcement of a different SOX whistleblower
statute. Compare SOX § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. II 2002) (silent regarding its
extraterritorial reach), with SOX § 1107, 18 U.S.C. 1513(d) (providing for extraterritorial
jurisdiction). The court in Carnero concluded that providing extraterritorial reach to section
1107 but not to section 806 "conveys the implication that Congress did not mean [for]
Section 806 to have extraterritorial effect." 433 F.3d at 10. In addition, the court noted that
[i]f the whistleblower protection provision is given extraterritorial reach in a case
like the present one, it would empower U.S. courts . . . to delve into the
employment relationship between foreign employers and their foreign employees
... [thereby] open[ing the door] for U.S. courts to examine and adjudicate
relationships abroad that would normally be handled by a foreign country's own
courts and government agencies pursuant to its own laws.
Id. at 15. In arriving at its decision not to extend the reach of section 806 abroad, the court
relied heavily on "the well-established principle of sovereignty that no nation has the right to
impose its labor standards on another country." Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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embarked upon a comity analysis regardless of which view it adopted as to
the appropriate role of such an analysis. Because the provisions of SOX are
really just amendments to the U.S. securities laws, the U.S. interest in this
case is just as substantial here as it would be in a pre-SOX violation of the
securities laws. However, the French interest in this case, unlike in those
cases where its blocking statute was employed to hamper U.S. discovery
orders, 373 is equally, if not more, compelling. First of all, the data
protection law was implemented long before any legislation like SOX was
ever contemplated. Moreover, it was implemented not just by France but
by the entire European Union-and thus was not enacted for the purpose of
circumventing SOX. 374  Second, France has a deep-seated cultural
antipathy toward anonymous denunciations dating at least as far back as
WWII, if not all the way back to the French Revolution. 375 Finally, the
U.S. interest in enforcing SOX's whistleblower hotline provision is severely
tempered under the circumstances. 376 The CNIL did not ban outright the
use of whistleblower hotlines as a violation of its data protection laws;
rather, it only directly opposed anonymous reporting, as contrasted to
confidential reporting which would be acceptable under certain
circumstances. 377 Therefore, providing relief in this situation would be
permitted in the public interest and would also be consistent with investor
protection. 378
After determining that providing relief to these two French subsidiaries
from SOX's anonymous whistleblower hotline requirement is appropriate,
the SEC would then have to determine how it should provide such relief. In
this particular situation, the SEC actually would have two options at its
disposal. First, assuming requests have already been made, the SEC could
issue favorable no-actions letters to these two French companies. Other
French companies, however, would then have to submit their own requests
in order to obtain relief.
Alternatively, the SEC may resolve this particular conflict by means of
an interpretive letter. SOX's whistleblower hotline provision requires
implementation of procedures for "the confidential, anonymous submission
by employees.., of concerns regarding questionable accounting or
auditing matters. '379 The comma between the words "confidential" and
"anonymous" implies a requirement for a confidential and anonymous
373. See supra note 347.
374. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part l.D.2.b.iii.
376. If France is found to strictly enforce its own corporate governance regulations,
which are equivalent to those of SOX, over companies in its territories, then the U.S.
national interest would be diminished even further because the absence of the protections
afforded to investors by SOX would be made up for by the presence of France's reasonably
equivalent corporate governance regulations.
377. See supra Part I.D.2.b.iv.
378. This relief would thus conform to 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2000).
379. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(B) (Supp. 112002).
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procedure for reporting financial inaccuracies.38 0 However, confidential
and anonymous whistleblowing procedures are mutually exclusive. That is,
a confidential procedure cannot be strictly anonymous.38' Consequently an
ambiguity exists in the SOX statute as to the phrase "confidential,
anonymous submission." As the agency appointed by Congress to
implement SOX (as well as the other securities laws), it is up to the SEC to
interpret the statute so as to remove this ambiguity. In this case, the SEC
could interpret the SOX whistleblower hotline provision in such a way that
its mandate would be satisfied by using confidential reporting procedures.
Once the SEC has declared that confidential whistleblower hotlines are
sufficient to meet the requirement of Section 301, the conflict between this
provision and French data protection laws would cease to exist, and French
companies would then be free to comply with SOX without facing
repercussions at home.
CONCLUSION
Exemptive relief from SOX is not only necessary, but is also in the
public interest. However, making exemptive relief too accessible only
subverts the purposes of the Act. Rather, a balance is needed between too
much and too little exemptive relief. Use of the no-action process, or some
other process that allows the SEC to consider exemptive relief on a case-by-
case basis, is the answer. The SEC should use this situation-specific
analysis to resolve any future conflicts between SOX and foreign laws.
Moreover, this approach need not be limited to SOX, but could also be
applied to resolve similar conflicts involving other securities laws.
380. Id.
381. This is because a confidential system requires that at least one person or machine
possesses the whistleblower's identity-that is, a whistleblower can in some way be traced
back to his report, though his or her identity will remain undisclosed.
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